Mary asked:

Proofs of the existence of God. Identify which of these arguments seems to be the best, and explain why you think so. Complete your response by reflecting on why philosophers have sought for thousands of years to provide such proofs, and whether it is necessary to do so.

Answer by Eric George

First of all let me clarify that the question ‘does God exist?’ is not a scientific one, it is a philosophical/ theological inquiry. Generally speaking, scientific proof, is based upon the repeatability of an experiment in order to validate whether or not the outcome of that certain experiment determines a falsification of something existing or the truth of something existing. In other words, science verifies truth by way of conducting tests which express certain consistencies within a prescribed method of obtaining such truths. So the person who wishes to assert that God does not exist because one cannot scientifically prove God’s existence is using a method of verification which is outside of the actual premise to begin with, since the matter of God’s existence is a philosophical and theological one, it follows therefore that the matter itself must be approached philosophically and theologically as well. The answer must be endeavored within the context of the question.

Philosophers have thought it necessary to provide answers to questions ever since western philosophy itself began with the ancient Greeks. If we treat the matter of the existence of God as another question then of course it is necessary to provide answers as to whether or not you believe God exists or does not exist. The pondering on God’s existence began as philosophy gathered mankind’s thoughts beyond the material world, as to whether nature defines us, society and culture defines us or whether something detached from all that we experience defines us i.e. God. It is necessary to take into consideration I believe since the matter itself has always been within and around the very subject of philosophy, the issue of God has become a tenant of basic common philosophical questions, meaning, purpose, destiny and such. Also, what is meant by ‘God’ — is it the highest good? The unmoved mover? A spiritual entity? The definitions for and what God is, are numerous indeed. I think it safe to say though, that generally within western society a reference to God means the accumulative expression of God put forward by christian theism, and more recently deism (which is a form of theism).

I would not say personally that anything can be proven indefinitely, since to prove something means that it could be no other way, and as such I would not use the term ‘proofs’ to denote mere arguments in favor of theism, the arguments themselves seek to provide evidence for the superiority of theism over atheism in a sort of arms-race to solidify the existence of God as a way of ‘following the evidence’ which somehow concludes that God exists. The arguments for the existence of God or ‘theistic arguments’, can be classically put forward as follows: The cosmological argument (from contingency), the moral argument (on objective moral values), the teleological argument (intelligent design, on fine-tuning), the ontological argument (on the existence of God, his existence to his actuality — the possibility therein), the historicity of christ argument (historical support for the crucifixion, death, burial and resurrection of christ — vindicates the existence of God) and an off-shoot of the cosmological argument coined as the kalaam cosmological argument (beginning to cause correlation, origins of the universe).

All six classical arguments for the existence of God, when studied in depth, are quite logical in the context that their premises are true; and their premises are more plausible in light of the evidence than their negations. However, I have some criticism to put forward. First of all the historicity of christ argument in comparison with the other five arguments, is quite weak since it depends mainly on the synoptic gospels and draws from early commentaries within church tradition. The sources drawn from outside church tradition are very scant; cite Josephus and Tacitus, you would think that more would be written about Jesus Christ of Nazereth, especially by historians who existed during and around that time which are external from church tradition. I feel that the extraordinary claim that the historicity of christ argument is making — in light of affirming the death and bodily resurrection of christ as a true historic event, is so scantly written and recorded about by any sources detached from church tradition that the argument collapses as non opus, even on the premise that the resurrection is some how the best explanation for some established facts such as the ’empty tomb’ and so forth. It seems to me that this argument should not even be apart of the theistic arsenal, it should be left a part, separate as an article of faith rather than an article of argument based upon historicity. Especially since the substance of such historicity cannot be measured to match the historic claim of such an argument.

That being said, there is one argument which seems to me to be very persuasive, I refer to the moral argument and what it is inclusive to. The moral argument for the existence of God simply put, explains that if objective moral values exist then therefore God exists since it would necessitate a mind prior to the Human mind to define moral values which are binding irrespective of ones culture and society, i.e. across the board. It also builds upon this by stating that if God does not exist, then accordingly, objective moral values do not exist and that what we term ‘morality’ is merely synonymous as an invention that we as Humans, have fabricated as time has gone on, as nothing more than a means of regulating our existence to socially survive in somewhat of a convenience. Life and ones actions within life are in essence totally subjective and non-binding, every individual creates their own sense of moral duties — whether this sense is fulfilled in murdering someone or helping someone, it matters not in the end. The moral argument for Gods existence is compelling, since it plays on both the emotional and intellectual scale of the Human mind.

Jeffrey asked:

What if every person sees colors different? like, my yellow is someone else’s green, we would never know! and maybe that’s why people have different favorite colors?

Answer by Craig Skinner

This colours argument is one of a number of ‘conceivability’ arguments intended to refute reductionism, that is to combat the notion that the mental is ultimately explicable by the physical.

So, the story goes, we can conceive of a situation where, on our viewing a ripe tomato, identical electrochemical goings-on occur in my brain and your brain, but the mental outcome is that I experience ‘red’ whereas you experience the sensation I do on viewing the sky on a clear sunny day (of course you call this sensation ‘red’ since we all learn that tomatoes are red, skies blue etc). So, the story continues, the quality of conscious experience doesn’t just depend on physical events in a brain interacting with the body and the world.

Another popular conceivability argument is the zombie one. I can conceive of an atom-for-atom duplicate of myself which has brain events identical with mine but totally lacks any consciousness. So, whatever explains consciousness, it isn’t physical events in a brain.

Descartes started it with his ‘clear and distinct’ conception of the separability of the mind and the body, so, he says, mind and body are separate substances (dualism), mind can exist without body etc.

I find these arguments tedious. I have two criticisms:

(1) Just because something is conceivable doesn’t mean its possible. Right now I can conceive of my cat jumping on the desk and deliberately typing in a sparkling finish to this answer. But it won’t. It can’t. Not in any possible world. It doesn’t have the brainpower. Of course in some possible worlds there will be cat-like creatures that can do this, but they won’t be cats as we understand the term ‘cat’.

(2) Advances in scientific understanding will show such arguments to be nonsense. Here are two examples. (a) I can conceive of a gas in which all the particles move faster and faster but the gas’s temperature doesn’t rise. So, whatever temperature increase is, it’s not necessarily to do with speeding up of particles. Wrong. Increase in temperature just IS speeding up of particles. (b) I can conceive of a world containing tiny, replicating bags of chemicals undergoing complex interactions (let’s call them ‘cells’), but these cells are not alive, just little bags of dead chemicals. So, whatever life is, it’s not explained by complex chemical interactions. Wrong. Life just IS complex interaction of dead chemicals in units drawing energy from the environment, maintaining dynamic stability and replicating.

So, I think the colours argument and the zombie argument will likewise be shown to be nonsensical by advances in cognitive science. In the meantime I find it completely implausible that healthy members of the same species would see colours differently. The onus is on those who think otherwise to come up with evidence for their view. And there is none. Or at least none that I find plausible. You suggest people’s having different favourite colours as evidence. Fair enough. Seeing colours differently is a conceivable explanation. But I don’t think it is the most likely one.

Answer by Helier Robinson

It’s not just colours, it’s all sensations: various degrees of hot and cold, rough and smooth, hard and soft, heavy and light, solid and liquid, loud and quiet, penetrability — to say nothing of tastes and smells — all are private to the person concerned. None can be compared to anyone else’s and so could in principle be different among different people. And then there are other animals: what are cats’ and dogs’ sensations like?

This fundamental privacy of sensations leads to a serious philosophical problem. In philosophy everything known through the senses is called empirical, and the world each of us perceives is their empirical world. An empirical world is a structure of empirical objects, which are structures of sensations. A structure is a set of relations holding sensations and objects together. But relations give trouble also: can we perceive them, or are they all in the mind of the perceiver? How can we perceive them if they do not have any empirical qualities, which is to say that they are not composed of sensations? But if they are all in the mind then they are private, just like sensations, in which case each person’s empirical world is private to them. How can this be reconciled with the common sense view that there is only one empirical world, which is real in the sense of continuing to exist when unperceived? The tendency among philosophers these days is to say that ‘somehow’ we perceive reality by means of sensations; the reality is one and public, the sensations are many and private. But in my (minority) view this is a cop out. Try to see if you can figure it out for yourself.

Jon asked:

A movement in the name of Occupy Wall Street began in the United States in September, and people around the world, including in Canada, have participated. Discuss how the ideas of at least two ‘thinkers’ can help make sense of these events.

Answer by Martin Jenkins

Post-Modernist: Gilles Deleuze

Influenced by the student events in France, 1968, Deleuze attempted to provide an explanation for their occurrence outside of existing Liberal Democratic and Marxist Theory. These were judged too insensitive to the micro-occurrences of events to provide a convincing account. Upon his earlier re-reading of Spinoza, Deleuze proposed that social reality or social ontology is composed of desires, forces. These are either active or reactive. Reactive forces manifest themselves in macro structures — general, established structures of a society [in his terminology: Molar Lines of Force; Aborescent or Sedentary Lines; Planes of Transcendent Organisation] such as the State and its mechanisms of control. Active forces are fluxes of desires, forces which transgress the established structures in new ways. [In his terminology: Micro lines; Rhizomatics, Planes of Immanence, Nomadic Lines]. Lines divide up and constitute the operation of reality.

Macro lines of established forces operate in a binary manner. It is a matter of either/or. So we have Capital vs. Labour, Ruling-Ruled, Male-Female, Adult-Child, Heterosexual-Homosexual and so on. Active Micro lines are in flight — active lines of flight which deteritorialise [I.e. uncouple the connecting lines] to establish forces in new, unpredictable and novel ways. They can make connections which were previously unthinkable [mechanic assemblages or reterritorialisation] thus evidencing the creative plasticity of active forces.

So in 1968, student demonstrations and uprisings were deemed to be supported by Deleuze’s view. They acted outside the established parameters of Labour-Capitalism, Socialism-Capitalism of orthodox Marxist thought. They were outside of the traditional liberal view of thinking, rational ‘zombie’ who passively votes for change via elections to representative office every five years. This held for feminist, for minority groups, for queer politics, for Identity politics. Moreover, their dynamic was not aborescent [hierarchical, macro-ordered and operating like a tree with foundations, controlling trunk and subordinate branches] but Rhizomatic [effecting new forms of organisation and being, horizontal not hierarchical, Participatory and not subordination].

In some respects, this could apply to the Occupy movement. The established, very sedentary Political apparatus has failed to articulate the grievances of the multitude. Whilst those established political, aborescent structures expect that issues can be raised and settled within those established political, aborescent structures, the Occupy movements call for some other alternative. The Occupy movements have made alliances of new mechanic assemblages with various, previously unconnected forces: veterans against the cuts, Christians, Muslims, ecologists, youth, the unemployed, activist involved in the ‘Arab Spring’, trade unionists — a heterogeneous assemblage which would not otherwise have connected. At the moment, the movement is formless eschewing order, hierarchy, programme, leadership allowing the creative manifestation of plural voices into the new. It is a nomadic machine of various assemblages from various sources deterritorialising the established macro structures and literally, deterritorialising and reterritorialising the space occupied by the reactive forces of finance and ‘politics’. Many commentators speak and write of a new movement occurring as yet undefined. As Deleuze said:

‘Politics is active experimentation, since we cannot know in advance which way a line is going to turn. Draw the line says the accountant [banker? MJ]: but one can in fact draw it anywhere.’ P. 103 Dialogues.

Marxist: Louis Althusser

Whilst Deleuze would emphasise the creative re-working of lines in new, unthematised ways, Marxists would propose that events to which the Occupy movements are responding to are systemic — they are inherent to the very nature of capitalism. In that sense, they are nothing new. Capitalism needs profits to survive, overproduction reduces the level of profits. In this instance, overextension of credit has led to the decline of profits, triggering economic slump. Whilst the Occupy movement might be an alliance of various social groups and forces, all have a commonality in that they are the victims of capitalism — a collective subject shaped by the Object of Capitalism. Young unemployed, anti-capitalist activists, Trade Unionists etc all share common interests. As such, they operate within and are explicable by the concepts and categories of Marxist theory. Although at a certain specific level, each group, each individual has their own issues; these are simultaneously common or universal: the specific is the universal and universal is specific. Again, Marxists following the theorist Louis Althusser would, whilst recognising the diversity, complexity of a society admit that each group faces its own specific tensions with, or specific contradictions with the structures of capitalism. Yet they are not wholly isolated or atomised. They also share a commonality in that a common structure — the economic, or the political, connects them. Each specific contradiction fuses with others to become overdetermined — they fuse into one general contradiction — operating at the macro-level. Revolutionary social change is then possible.

That the traditional ‘labour movement’ has not yet come on side does not exclude it in favour of new social forces. The problem with the Deleuzian analyses is that it emphasises dynamics at the micro-level, the macro-level of Lines are to be deterritorialised then reterritorialised with something new. It is held that movement from below will somehow change, subvert the macro-level through many, mini-revolutions. It is about changing the world without gaining power as John Holloway would say.

Unfortunately, this doesn’t happen. Despite Deleuzian’s and Anarchists criticism that macro-level change merely brings about a new macro-level which will repeat the failings of the previous one, Marxists will conclude that social and revolutionary change qua change has to occur at the macro-level and for that, macro-level organisations such as the labour movement and revolutionary vanguard parties are required. This doesn’t entail the existing, sedentary forces but new, reinvigorated ones but, they will be operating at the macro-level. Without this, there will be no change.

Lynsey asked:

Debates between evolutionary biologists and ‘scientific creationists’ have been famously unproductive, with each side employing distinct criteria of judgment. Can the philosophy of science proposed by Karl Popper resolve the impasse for objective rational bystanders, and if so, how?

Answer by Craig Skinner

The short answer is NO. Popper formulated his view more than 70 years ago, the debates and impasse continue.

A longer answer is necessary.

Popper was impressed by the difference between psychoanalysis and Marxism on the one hand, and Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity on the other. Whereas the former systems could accommodate any observations, the latter made surprizing predictions which, if not observed, would refute the theory. So, for example, Adler’s psychoanalysis specified the early experiences allegedly causing an inferiority complex. This ‘explained’ why a person who lacked confidence and let people walk all over him had his inferiority complex. But suppose a person with the same early experiences was confident and forceful – didn’t this refute the theory? No, he had an inferiority complex ‘really’, and his opposite traits were a reaction to this. And so on. The theories could never be refuted.

Einstein, contrariwise, predicted bending of starlight near the sun, differing from what Newton predicted. If Einstein’s prediction was wrong, his theory would be refuted. Famously, he was right. Popper proposed falsifiability as the key criterion for distinguishing science from pseudoscience. It proved a popular suggestion, especially with scientists, who were presented as heroic figures willing to let their cherished theory die at the hands of a single awkward fact, which is not how scientists actually work.

To turn to creation science now, and resolving the ‘impasse’.

There are 2 distinct issues:

1. Is ‘creation science’ (or its modern version ‘intelligent design’) science or religion?

2. Which explanation for biodiversity does the evidence favour – evolution or special creation?

1. Is it science?

This has been the subject of heated US debate. The reason? The US constitution forbids the teaching in schools of any particular religious views as being established. So if creationism is religion it cant be taught, whereas if it’s science it can. If creationists can get their view accepted as science, they win the battle. The constitution allows bad, as well as good, science to be taught, so creationism could be given equal time with evolution. So far the courts have ruled that creationism is religion. They have had to specify the criteria distinguishing science from pseudoscience, and have suggested (i) Explanation by natural law (as opposed to supernatural) (ii) Views held provisionally (alterable by new evidence) (iii) Testability against the empirical world (iv) Falsifiability (able to suggest observations/ experiments which could refute the theory)

Creationists counter that (i) begs the question, that they do hold views provisionally, that their views are testable and falsifiable e.g. that the Earth is 6000 years’, not billions of years’, old; that human ancestry is entirely separate from apes. They have a fair point and maybe evolutionists should accept that creationism is bad science, and let people decide on the evidence.

2. Which explanation does the evidence favour?

I think the evidence in favour of evolution is overwhelming for ‘objective rational bystanders’. But, on the whole, that’s not what people are, especially in the US. Popper’s falsifiability criterion plays its part (countless observations, any of which could have refuted evolutionary theory, have been made).

But science is not in the business of proof. That’s for logic and maths, and doesn’t tell us anything about the world. Science is about giving the most likely explanation for what we observe, given current evidence. Strictly, no theory can be falsified: faced with a contrary finding, rather than giving up the theory we can give up an auxiliary hypothesis eg the observations are wrong, the instruments were faulty etc. And, strictly, no theory can ever be 100% confirmed: for any set of observations, there is always more than one explanation consistent with them – indeed an infinity of explanations. So, no amount of evidence can disprove a hypothesis (Duhem’s problem), no amount of evidence can prove a hypothesis (Hume’s problem), simply emphasizing that science is not in the proof business.

Others, such as Kuhn, Lakatos and Thagard, have proposed alternative demarcation criteria. But the bottom line is that there cannot be a sharp distinction between science and pseudoscience. Judgment and familiarity with how science and scientists work are needed, This is often lacking in US citizens including most current candidates running for Presidential nomination. The latter include creationists, and ‘global warning fears are a conspiracy’ merchants, but nobody with a background in science or philosophy.

Nalvaravu asked:

What is the reason for the existence of women on this earth?

Are they just ‘child bearing machines’ and ape what men do? where do they have edge over men?

Answer by Eric George

What is the reason for anything existing? This is one of the most fundamental questions that forms the basis of Philosophical inquiry. Cosmologically, what is Humanities role within this vast Universe – this has much to do with how one would view the origins of our entire species and whether or not subjective to this premise, one could attach anything beyond speciesism. The reason for anything existing to begin with is largely dependent upon the conditions of that thing coming into existence, humanity needs women for the preservation and continuation of our survival.

This does not mean that men are somehow inferior to women, men and women alike need each other in order for our species to survive in a general sense. However, in many primitive societies around the world (take for example many tribal communities within Papua New Guinea), feminine worship and prioritisation takes preeminence exactly for this reason; that they are viewed as an essential biological mechanism within the context of the tribes future existence. Therefore, taking care of them is of the utmost importance i.e. – preserving the existence of the women within the tribe, is actually preserving the existence of the tribe itself.

So to say that women have an edge over men merely because they birth children, would be to say that ones biological capabilities determines ones innate worth – a premise which would not take a liking to I am sure, especially since much of the worlds history has been determined by the decisions of men. On the flip side, if you were to apply the view practically, that women are merely child bearing machines and nothing more, then this again is something which collapses upon itself because it in essence overlooks the implications of the personality, traits, qualities and such therein. It would reduce society and culture from an anthropological standpoint, to a mundane existence of self-worth and dignity being subjective to whether or not you are able to reproduce, thus casting those who are not able to (barren womb, infertility etc.) as worthless and to a great extent obsolete.

Jan asked:

Who claimed that forms reside in physical objects?

Answer by Tony Fahey

Hi Jan, it seems to me that the philosopher whose approach to forms best meets your requirements is Aristotle. As you probably know, Plato held that the world we live in is the world of appearances. The ultimate reality is the world of Ideal Forms. Things we experience through the senses derive their reality, he says, from this ultimate world of ideas. Whilst Plato`s approach can be seen as metaphysical, or even ontological, Aristotle`s approach can be said to be scientific. Although taught by Plato, Aristotle rejected his master’s concept of a realm of Ideal Forms removed from that of the physical or material world. Reference to this different approach to can be seen in Rafael’s painting, The School of Athens, in which Plato is shown pointing to the heavens, whilst Aristotle is pointing towards things much closer to hand.

For Aristotle then, the ‘form’, or ‘idea’, is simply a mental image of something we have experienced in the perceptible world. For example, the idea we form of a dog is drawn from our experience of seeing a number of dogs. The idea, says Aristotle, has no existence on its own – it does not exist in a metaphysical realm detached from this physical or material world. For Aristotle the ‘idea’ or ‘form’ of something is made up of that thing’s characteristics. These characteristics define what a thing is – or what species it belongs to. That is, the form or idea of something consists of those characteristics common to all similar things. For example, the form of a cat consists of those characteristics which are common to all cats: it has whiskers, four legs and a tail, and it mews. Aristotle, then, disagrees with Plato when he says that the form comes before the physical entity.

Aristotle’s investigation into the principles of matter (that is, of things physical) leads him to draw an important distinction between form and matter. A classic example that illustrates this distinction is that of a bronze statue: bronze is the matter, whilst the figure of the statue is the form. Neither matter nor form can exist independently – for form is the idea that informs or gives shape to the physical or material thing. Even a crude lump of bronze would have some form, though the form would be less distinctive than that of the statue. Similarly, it would not be possible for form to exist without some physical matter to take on that form.

Thus, although Aristotle agrees with Plato that there are forms, and that these forms are universals, he holds that the concept of universals derives not from the world of Ideal Forms, but from empirical experience. For Aristotle ‘nothing is found in the intellect which was not found first in the senses’ (‘Nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu’).Therefore, while, for Plato the world of Ideas is the ultimate reality, of which everything that we experience in this world is but an inferior copy, for Aristotle, the concept of universals is a posteriori – they derive from our experience with the natural world. In sum, for Plato, things in the physical world are copies of ideas which have their original, or archetypes in the metaphysical realm of Ideal Forms, while for Aristotle, forms are ideas that derive from empirical experience.