Linda asked:

Why should I be moral?

Answer by Craig Skinner

You ask for what has been called the Holy Grail of Moral Philosophy: an argument that will convince an amoralist or egoist that she should be moral. Alas, no such argument has yet been found, although great philosophers have tried, and I will sketch some attempts.

By moral I take it that you mean acting for the sake of others rather than purely selfishly. And I take it that you accept it is best for an amoralist to live in a society where others are moral, all the better to exploit them, rather than in a society of each against all in which life is ‘solitary, violent, nasty, brutish and short’ as Hobbes puts it.

In short, you ask why shouldn’t I be a ‘sensible knave’ as Hume puts it, acting morally when it suits me, even gaining a reputation as a moral person, but acting immorally if it’s to my advantage and I think I can get away with it.

Of course morality is the norm. Rather like language, it comes naturally to us with exposure to instances in childhood reinforced by teaching. But to give an account in terms of evolved human nature is to explain it. What concerns us here is to justify it, to find good reasons for being moral.

Three main arguments have been put forward to justify morality.

1. God commands it
2. Happiness requires it
3. Acting immorally is irrational

1. God commands it.

But we have no good reason to believe in God, or that God must have moral rules, or that we can know about these. Even if they existed, why should we obey them? God’s being our creator, or loving us, don’t seem good reasons. Hope of heaven or fear of hell appeal to expediency or self-interest, not to morality. We might follow the rules because they are good rules. But then appeal to divine command is redundant — God (if good) commands the rules because they are good, rather than the rules being good because God commands them, as Socrates famously argues in Euthyphro. Even for monotheists, divine command is an unsatisfactory basis for morality. Thus Aquinas held that the moral law, albeit God’s law, stands up on rational grounds alone. Despite its philosophical shortcomings, divine command is given as a reason for being moral by many monotheistic religious persons, some citing fear of God as the incentive. But it cuts no ice for everybody else, including the amoralist.

2. Happiness requires it.

This is the answer of Aristotle and of modern virtue ethics. Having regard to human nature (as rational, social, child-rearing mammals) we identify the chief good for humans as ‘eudaimonia’ (flourishing, living and doing well), achieved in a community, and characterized as ‘rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue’ (Aristotle). A virtuous life is the most fulfilled one — most of the virtues are centred on others’ welfare, and the fulfilled life is not one of (only) self-interest. Whether virtue is necessary for eudaimonia is arguable. Socrates thought so. In Plato’s Republic, in response to the challenge of Glaucon/ Adeimantus, he argues for the extreme position that the just (moral) man, even if considered unjust, reviled and rejected by society, is nevertheless happier than the unjust man with a reputation for justness who is respected and lives comfortably. Here, Socrates goes too far, but there is much in the view that the villain who appears to flourish as the green bay tree is not really happy. A view forcefully put by the late Phillipa Foot and with which I have much sympathy. Here we hold, with Plato, that the ruthless, wealthy mobster, surrounded by minders, forever alert for attempts to deceive, ruin or kill him, is ignorant of what constitutes real happiness. Eudaimonic considerations can provide justification of the moral life to some people. To me, for one.

3. Acting immorally is irrational.

This is one strand in the above eudaimonic argument, but is a view particularly held by Kant: the moral law is what we legislate for ourselves as rational autonomous beings, so that, as rational agents, we follow it, and to do otherwise is irrational. The argument essentially is as follows:

P1: my interests matter
P2: others are relevantly similar to me
Concl: others’ interests matter as much as mine

But the amoralist can simply interpret P1 as ‘my interests matter to me’, and P2 as ‘others’ interests matter to them’ which does not entail that others’ interests matter to me. But now, if the amoralist holds that her pain is really bad (as opposed to bad for her) or resents others for not helping her, she would show practical irrationality.

In conclusion, there is no knockdown logical argument that can convince a determined egoistic, amoral, ‘sensible knave’ to be moral. But, here, we are no worse off than trying to convince the determined sceptic that the external world exists. As Hare said, ‘Ask not ‘how do I convince the amoralist to be virtuous?’, but rather ‘how do we mostly bring up our children?”. Most of us accept that we have reason to be moral (as we accept the existence of the external world), otherwise why would we teach our children to be so. It is the best way to a fulfilled life, though bad luck can ruin things, and avoids practical irrationality that intellectually honest persons would wish to avoid.

Agenagn asked:

What purpose does the analogy of the lambs and eagles serve in Nietzsche’s philosophy?

Answer by Martin Jenkins

In the first treatise of On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche is examining the origin of primitive Master and Slave values. In this context, 13 is talking about how the lambs (i.e. the slave masses) might respond and evaluate the actions of the eagles (i.e. the Masters). This is part of his wider attempt to account for the genealogy of contemporary moral values; of how the slave values usurped and stifled primitive Master values.

Context

The Masters exude well-being, strength and their ‘happiness’ is identical with their activity. Their life instantiates corresponding values which are autobiographical (they designate what is good and bad — not Evil) and are affirmative as they do not grow from opposition, ressentiment or negation against someone or something. Where ressentiment may appear, it is fleeting; it is expressed and forgotten.

Against this, slave valuation is reactive. They are physiologically sick, regretting their lives and blaming the Masters for this. This ressentiment condemns the Masters for their behaviour. With the help of the Priests (themselves a split from the Master cast who are also suffering from sickness), a rebellion in morality is undertaken. The Masters behaviour and values a re re-valued.

As part of the re-evaluation, a new way of thinking and doing is adopted. This paradigm of thinking proffers Free-will, therefore culpability for one’s actions ultimately before the god of the priests/slaves. Hence we can see the enunciation of Judaism, Christianity and their metaphysical philosophy which subsequently dominates the history and development of the Western world.

Eagle/Lamb Analogy

With reference to the Eagle/lamb analogy, this elaborates on the origin and formulation of the value ‘good’ from the slave perspective which, at the same time, is the re-evaluation of the Masters understanding of ‘good’. Whilst the Eagles (i.e Masters) prey on the lambs, this is not done out of cruelty but out of instinctive necessity. The lambs (i.e. the slaves) evaluate this action and judge it wrong. In doing so, they invoke metaphysical categories and concepts of thinking.

These create a person, a subject, essence, substratum, soul, which is the conscious author or origin of his/her actions. Hence the person or doer is separate from his/her actions. As such, s/he is morally responsible for them. Similarly, the flash of the lightning is taken to be an effect of the lightning and not intrinsic to the phenomenon itself.

This further furnishes the idea of causality that there is a cause and an effect. This is later taken up as the basis of natural science where there is cause and effect (force moves and force causes) and a site or subject for this occurrence (i.e. the atom replaces but is built upon the concept of subject, substratum, essence).

Returning to the analogy, the lambs believe that the Eagles can behave other than they do. Yet this is asking strength not to be strength in the same way it is asking weakness not to be weakness. Nietzsche thinks this is absurd and is perpetuated by thinking that has its origin in the slave revolt and its values. He further hints at his doctrine of Will to Power, of the ontological nature of things when he writes that:

‘A quantum of power is just such a quantum of drive, will, affect- more precisely it is nothing other than this very driving, willing, affecting, and only through the seduction of language (and the basic errors of reason petrified therein), which understands and misunderstands all effecting as conditioned by an effecting something by a ‘subject’, can it appear otherwise.’ (13. Good & Evil, Good & Bad. ibid).

So the Masters act as they do because of their innate strength, power, will to power. The weakness of the slaves compels them to re-evaluate this behaviour from the standpoint their life — which is weakness — with values that correspondingly, flow from weakness. Part of this valuation is the belief in causality and responsibility (the subject causes a consequence) expressed in the ‘seduction of language’ and the ‘basic errors of reason petrified in them’ i.e. judeo-christian theology/ metaphysics.

So weak lambs are ‘good’. This entails values of not engaging in violence, injuring no-one, not attacking, not retaliating, they leave vengeance to their god, they avoid all conflict and ‘evil’, demand very little of life, are patient, humble and therefore-righteous. This is in contradistinction to the Masters actions and values, is labelled ‘good’ and follows upon the ontological weakness of the slaves; from their reduced Will to Power due to physiological sickness, weakness.

Further, because of the Slaves (lambs) belief in causality there is also a belief in freedom of the will to choose actions and to be responsible for doing them. So the Masters can choose to do what they do and, not to do it. As the slaves view their actions as wrong, as ‘Evil’, the masters can be held accountable for them and condemned accordingly. The Masters self-proclaimed ‘good’ actions are now revalued as ‘Evil’.

This is not to say that Nietzsche wants a return to such crude, primitive behaviour. He is pointing out that values and perspectives that have dominated Western being for two thousand years had their origin in weakness, in a weak and suffering type of life. The strong and primitive Will to Power of the Masters is channelled and redirected (see the second Treatise of the Genealogy-Guilt, Bad Conscience and Related Matters’). It occasionally emerges throughout history and Nietzsche is concerned to see the emergence of this strong Will to Power in drives, passions and affects that can challenge the timid, restrictive morality that dominated at the time of his writing; which had its origin in the slave revolt and which in Nietzsche’s view, prevents life from being superlative in certain human beings.

Chris asked:

Do you consider alcoholism a self inflicted illness? Or an illness at all?

Answer by Eric George

I remember watching a documentary once which dealt with people who were admitted to a special weight-loss camp due to their severe life threatening obesity, they were put on specialised eating plans, underwent vigorous exercise initiatives and were monitored on a somewhat frequent basis by Clinical Nutritionists. There was one particular man who was told by one of the Nutritionists that he had to revert to a purely fruit and vegetable diet with some red meat input here and there for iron intake, after about 13 days, upon weighing him again his Nutritionist was surprised by the fact that the man had actually gained weight instead of losing it! After asking if the man had kept to the diet prescribed, the man replied: ‘Well of course I have, I have been eating 50 oranges a day, oranges are healthy aren’t they?’ — After the initial shock, the Nutritionist was quick to point that eating 50 of anything is bad for you and will cause you to put on weight regardless of what that thing is.

I believe the same goes for alcohol, as the truism goes: ‘Too much of anything is a bad thing’ — alcohol in moderation is nothing more than a trivial enjoyment of a beverage which could be enjoyed on social occasions or in company with a good read on a rainy night or something similar. Alcoholism, that is the desire to drink alcohol uncontrollably in an unwarranted, unjustified and unchecked way is to me not an illness perse but rather an addiction which has trapped the addict such as how a slave owner would mentally and emotionally trap a slave. An alcoholic is someone, who for possibly many different reasons (such as personal negative emotional and/or mental experiences), has come to understand alcohol as a means of reliance and what psychology would term a ‘void filler’.

The alcoholic at the point of dangerous levels of addiction, sees only the bottom of a bottle as a means of escaping reality for whatever reason, and contrary to many people who claim that all alcoholics do not know that what they are doing is harmful to themselves and possibly others around them such as their families and friends; a lot of recovered alcoholics I have conversed with, told me directly that they knew what they were doing was harmful on an emotional, mental and often physical level (physical violence etc.) to themselves and those around them, but that they merely turned a ‘blind eye’ to it. Many of them came to see a warped love and desire for alcohol as a superior justification paramount to that over a love for their very own families and friends.

So in conclusion, I would not go as far as to say that alcoholism is an illness, but rather an addiction which has gone unchecked and which has thus taken on a new meaning in and of itself. It is a self-inflicted addiction only in the context that the addict himself or herself is responsible for turning to alcohol as a void filler for whatever reason, rather than talking to someone about the reasons themselves and addressing them, firstly as to why they turned to alcohol as a void filler and so forth and so on. Alcoholics are people just like us and should not be alienated or treated as social outcasts merely because their vices have become their undoing. All of us, must seek a balance in life in whatever we do, and to do everything in careful and appropriate moderation. Especially when it comes to things which can get so out of control, so very quickly, such as drinking alcohol.

Ystein asked:

What is truth?

Almost every sentence one makes is an assertion. For example, the previous one. I can’t seem to avoid making such sentences. When asking some people, they find the question easy… ‘something is true when it corresponds to reality’. But, what does it mean that something is ‘real’? Am I not saying, when I for instance propose a law of physics, that it is true it is real? And what is reality really? The sum of all truths?

While I somehow find comfort in the fact that the shower has warm water, it simultaneously holds no ‘meaning’ to me. Yes it is true that it is warm, but what does it matter, this truth? Why am I so eager to know what is ‘true’ and not in this world? Why do I feel proud when people say it is true I am a great person?

I understand the value in the things that are assigned the truth values themselves. I can appreciate ‘warm’ and ‘happy’. But I am lately feeling strange about statements like ‘exercising is good for you.’

Anyway, I do believe a bit of careful reading is needed to understand this question, and it is nearly nonunderstandable. To say what is true about truth is a tough job.

Answer by Geoffrey Klempner

You’ve got the main point of this: ‘every sentence one makes [i.e. states] is an assertion’. To say that we are puzzled by truth is to say that we are puzzled by each and every act of assertion, including humdrum examples like, ‘The shower is warm,’ ‘My coffee is cold’, ‘Cows have four legs’, ‘Ask a Philosopher was launched in 1999’, ‘David Cameron had a boiled egg for breakfast this morning.’

The odd-one out for me is the sentence referring to David Cameron. I don’t know whether it is true or not. It might be. But then again, Do I know, absolutely for certain, that cows have four legs? Couldn’t I be wrong? Or couldn’t I be wrong about the date Ask a Philosopher was launched? (don’t I need to check? but how carefully? what would be sufficient to confirm that the date is the one I gave?).

As you can see, discussions of truth easily get bogged down in sceptical considerations. But this does confuse things, from a philosophical standpoint. The lazy assumption people tend to make here is that scepticism undermines our grasp on the concept of truth. But actually, the reverse is the case. To say that I don’t know, e.g., what David Cameron had for breakfast assumes that there is an answer to that question. It is either true or false that David Cameron had a boiled egg for breakfast this morning.

But suppose I’d asked instead what was David Cameron’s first thought when he woke up? Does he even know for sure? He’s a busy man, with lots of things to think about. He might have forgotten. Now, if I ask that question, does that question HAVE an answer too, even if no-one can ever know for certain what that answer is?

This is the problem of realism, which connects with the ‘correspondence theory of truth’ which you refer to. The correspondence theory looks like something that one would appeal to in defence of realism — in defence of the idea that questions which we are unable to answer nevertheless ‘have’ an answer in reality — but when you look more closely, it becomes apparent that the correspondence theorist is merely uttering a tautology.

For example, David Cameron’s first thought was about the strength of the Pound, if and only the statement, ‘David Cameron’s first thought was about the strength of the Pound’ corresponds to the facts. Which fact, exactly? Well, the fact that David Cameron’s first thought was about the strength of the Pound! What kind of answer were you expecting?!

A British philosopher who has contributed more than anyone else to the debate about realism is Michael Dummett, who died last week. According to the Guardian, Dummett was ‘one of the greatest British philosophers of the 20th century’. You can read his obituary here:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/28/sir-michael-dummett?fb=optOut

Chrissy asked:

Do you know if there is a digital copy somewhere that I can see of Physics by Aristotle… and just curious about your opinion concerning the one mind theory… that we’re all connected, we’re all made of energy and we are all one mind… kinda like a light we all have.

Answer by Shaun Williamson

Yes you can read it or even download a text copy at:

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.html

I can’t make any sense of the one mind theory. The mind isn’t a physical thing or even a ghostly thing. ‘Mind’ is an abstract concept in our language, don’t be tempted to turn it into a ghostly substance. Minds aren’t like footballs. There isn’t one mind nor are there many minds. We are not made of energy and we are not all connected except maybe by telephone. Lights are candles or powered by electricity. Any other sort of light is metaphorical.

Bernita asked:

If someone asked you what Taoism means, how would you explain?

Answer by Eric George

I would encourage you to study Taoism by not only reading material about Taoism, but also try and converse with any self-confessed Taoists living in your community if possible. It is always an advantage to read books about Taoism from a variety of different sources, and then to compare what you have read, with the information that you are told by an actual adherent of that particular belief system, in this case; Taoism. This way you ensure, that you are getting a very well rounded understanding of what that is you are studying. However, to answer your question, I personally would recommend that you be very quick to point out to the person inquiring about Taoism that there are some internal distinctions to be made when describing most religions and to this rule Taoism is not an exception.

Taoism, a religion native to China, could be viewed from a number of different perspectives and definitions due to its broad history and existence as a religion. In this context, Taoism in general is inclusive to three main interpretations of itself; first Taoism could be viewed as a purely philosophical religion based upon a somewhat secular interpretation of the many Taoist philosophers writings such as Lao zi (‘Tao Te Ching’) Zhuangzi and the likes, secondly Taoism could be understood as a theistic religion with deities, celestial masters, rituals and everything else commonly associated with theistic religions — this second definition of what Taoism is, could be termed as ‘organised Taoism’. Much like the second definition but contrasting in its approach to the theistic elements of Taoism, the third main perspective of Taoism is known as ‘popular Taoism’, which is rightly named so because it is a very popular expression of Taoism within China. Basically put, popular Taoism is a theological flurry of organised Taoism and many different forms of pre-Taoist Chinese ancestral worship and elemental polytheism.

Taoism therefore, could be defined as the following; philosophical Taoism, organised Taoism or popular Taoism — and/or a combination of all three. It is an understandable habit that we as mere external observers of religions such as Taoism — which is culturally, philosophically and historically rich, take for granted that a lot of the time on a superficial level we merely state and explain a belief system to someone else, from our own clear-cut ‘single angled’ definition. What is beautiful about studying religions like Taoism, is that when you take the time to learn more and more, you then come to comprehend that underneath a seemingly surface like simplicity, there exists a profound depth of complexity and intricate patterns of philosophical, theological and cultural threads. And it is your task to weave an image, which truly does justice to religion in discussion.