Abi asked:

Does it matter if an artist expresses racist views? Is his/her work more important than their politics? I am thinking particularly of Wagner.

Answer by Chris Finlay

The short answer is no, an artist’s work is more important than his or her own political views however I appreciate with some one like Wagner the issues are really quite difficult. As some one who loves Wagner’s music, I am appalled by his life style and his anti-Semitic views. However that shouldn’t detract from the power of his music. It’s interesting that for example no one makes much of the anti-Semitism of Shakespeare as expressed in the Merchant of Venice, or the racism associated with Othello or the sexism in so called comedies such as the Taming of the Shrew. As far as these plays are concerned there is far more explicit racism, Anti-Semitism or Sexism than anything you would find in Wagner’s Operas.

In Philosophical circles, Frege who founded analytical philosophy was extremely anti-Semitic but no one would deny the value of his work in logic. Michael Dummett who did much to bring Frege to the consciousness of 20th century philosophers speaks at length about the disappointment he felt when he realised this. Other examples include Nietzsche, who has been accused in some circles as laying the foundation for fascism, and Plato who according to Popper laid the foundations of totalitarianism. Yet Nietzsche influenced Michael Foucault, whose critique of power as expressed in Madness and Civilization can hardly be accused of fascism.

So back to Wagner, his music has been extremely influential and if you wish to understand how music developed in the latter part of the 19th century you can’t ignore it. You may reject it as Stravinsky tried to but it is impossible to understand say Schoenberg, Richard Strauss or Alban Berg with out the influence of Wagner. Just as you can’t ignore the influence of Nietzsche on Continental philosophy or the influence of Frege on Analytical philosophy. I would say enjoy the music for what it is, don’t get to hung up on the personal views of the artist or the composer. Certainly don’t fall for the ad hominem fallacy, that because Wagner was Anti-Semitic, those who admire his music must be Anti-Semitic. After all Hitler was a vegetarian and a dog lover are we to say that all vegetarians and dog lovers are also Nazi’s. Great geniuses often have flawed personalities, that shouldn’t detract from the value of their work.

If you want to read more about this topic then a good starting point is Brian Magee’s book on Wagner and Philosophy

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Wagner-Philosophy-Bryan-Magee/dp/0140295194

Hope this helps.

John asked:

How did Plato’s Theory of Forms answer Heraclitus and Parmenides?

Answer by Helier Robinson

This question could be the opening of a book on the history of western philosophy.

First of all, an explanation of why Heraclitus and Parmenides held the views they did. This arises from the problem of identity and change, which is the problem that one thing logically cannot change with time and remain one (identical).

Although this contradicts common sense, the logic of it is quite simple: it arises from the fact that qualitative change entails quantitative change. This can be proved quite easily: whatever A and B might be, if there is a qualitative difference between them then there is some quality, Q, such that A is Q and B is not-Q (or vice versa); so if A and B are one then one thing is at once Q and not-Q, which is impossible; hence A and B must be two, they cannot be one. In particular, one thing cannot travel through time and change as it goes: either it remains one, in which case it cannot change, or else it changes and loses its oneness, its identity.

Heraclitus took the position that only change is real, there is no identity. ‘You cannot step into the same river twice’ he said; because the river, having changed, is a new river, and you, having changed, are a new you. ‘Nothing is permanent except the fact of change’ is another of his sayings. Change is real, identity is illusion. And Parmenides took the opposite position: ‘All change is illusion, only the One [identity] is.’

Plato tried to resolve this problem by saying that there are two worlds. There is the ‘real’ world of the Forms, which are perfect and unchanging, and the sensible world that we all perceive around us, which is an imperfect copy of the world of forms, and insofar as the copy is imperfect so is it illusory. Included in among these illusions are the appearances of change, as well as familiar illusions such as visible space shrinking with distance, in all three dimensions.

If we now fast track to modern times, we still have two worlds: the sensible world we perceive around us, which is called the empirical world and which is the object of study of empirical science, and the world of theoretical science, which physicists describe as the world of underlying causes of empirical phenomena and which is is imperceptible, or non-empirical (which is what ‘theoretical’ and ‘underlying’ mean). (To describe causes is to explain their effects, so theoretical science explains what empirical science describes.) The empirical world is an imperfect copy of the theoretical world, and insofar as it is imperfect so is it illusory. Thus visible space shrinks with distance and all secondary qualities (i.e. sensations) are illusory, but the sense data that yield scientific laws are not. Particularly noteworthy is one similarity between theoretical science and ancient Greek philosophy: Einstein’s space-time is surprisingly similar to Parmenides’ One: if time is a dimension within space-time then there is no passage of time and our sensation of such passage is illusory.

The original problem is not yet solved, of course. In particular, to claim that something is an illusion requires that the fact of the illusion be explained, and the illusion of passage of time is so far inexplicable. However there is a lesson to be learned from all this. It is the problem of how much truth there is in common sense. English language philosophy has always preferred common sense to logical argument. John Locke, for example, worked out his philosophy very logically but always retreated when he got too far from common sense, and A. J. Ayer repeatedly said that any argument that went too far from common sense must be wrong. And one cannot help sympathise: common sense is the cumulative practical experience of centuries of living in a hostile world, and therefore only to be gainsaid reluctantly. On the other hand, if Ayer is right then Einstein’s theories of relativity, all of quantum mechanics. and all of modern mathematics must be wrong.

Al asked:

Compare and contrast how Kant and Aristotle would answer the question ‘why be moral?’

Answer by Craig Skinner

Kant would say that to be immoral is to be irrational.

Aristotle would say that to be immoral is to be ignorant of what contributes to a fulfilled life.

To expand slightly:

For Kant, moral action is action in accordance with rational self-legislation ie in line with maxims that any rational being would wish everybody to act on. When acting morally, we act on rules that we ourselves, as rational creatures, lay down, as suitable for all of us to act on within a community of rational beings. So, to act immorally is to act irrationally. Kant seeks to establish, a priori, morality as it (necessarily) applies to all rational beings, not just to humans, although it does apply to us insofar as we are rational. Of course application to humans must take account of the contingent features we happen to have as humans (such as being sexually active, tribal, social animals), but Kant thinks of this as ‘anthropology’ rather than ethics.

Aristotle’s views are more naturalistic, tailored to human nature. He says that everything has a proper end (telos) or function (ergon) and has virtues appropriate to that end (sharpness is a virtue in a knife whose proper end is cutting). Reason is the characteristic feature of humans compared with other animals, and our proper end is ‘virtuous activity of the soul in accordance with reason’ which constitutes a fulfilled, good life (‘eudaimonia’, flourishing, happiness).

Both appeal to reason. Kant makes it his centrepiece. Aristotle gives a role to emotion, but allows reason as our key attribute and holds that virtuous activity requires practical wisdom (acquired with time and effort).

Any moral theory has to account for the amoralist.

Take the main character (played by Ray Liotta) in Scorsese’s film ‘Goodfellas’ about Mafia middle managers. Liotta grasses on his bosses, gets witness protection and moves to an anonymous life in a distant city with his wife, children, suburban house, garden, car and ordinary job. He laments the passing of the old days:

‘If I wanted a theatre ticket, best seat in a restaurant, a new car, it was only a phone call away. Now I stand in line like everybody else. That’s how It’ll be for the rest of my days – living like a schmuck’.

How does the Aristotelian, Kantian, or any other moralist convince Liotta that his new (potentially ethical) life is better than his old (unethical) mobster life. Will we convince him that he is irrational (Kant), ignorant of what constitutes a truly happy life (Aristotle), or that he can now help maximize the good (utilitarian) ? I think not. Ethical appeals, on the whole, work only with people already living within an ethical framework of some sort. If somebody genuinely doesn’t see that, say, torturing young children for fun is just wrong, nothing I can say will make a difference. Aristotle would say such people are not normal, do not share in the important features of our common human nature. I am inclined to agree. Psychopaths lack the usual human emotional responses to viewing or inflicting suffering. The defect appears to lie in damage to the emotional brain centres (specifically the amygdala). Hume would be unsurprised, but sadly for Kant, such people’s rational intelligence appears normal.

Thankfully, the question you put is typically only asked (by adults) in the context of philosophical discussion. If our children ask it (in words or by their bad behaviour) we usually give them a Kantian answer (‘what would it be like if everybody did that’) or an Aristotelian one (‘ you’ll do better in life if you don’t behave like that’). And at heart most of us believe that acting morally is good for a person, else why would we try to bring up our children to do so.

Eirik asked:

Does there exist objective truths about what football (soccer) team is the best? My friends keep telling me that it’s possible, on the basis of statistics, to say that Spain objectively is the best national team in the world. I say there are no objective truths about these things. It would be extremely interesting to have a philosophers’ perspective on this!

Answer by Tony Fahey

Eirik, I must say that as a life-long and avid soccer fan, I find this question both interesting and tantalizingly challenging. Having given your query some consideration, it seems to me that we should look at this from two perspectives: the first is to determine if there is enough statistical evidence to support your friends claim that the Spanish soccer team is worthy of the title ‘the Best National Team in the World’, (I take you mean the squad that won the 2010 World Cup and the squad representing Spain in the 2014 campaign), and the second to see if one can say that there are objective truths (by which I take it that you mean truths that pertain at all times and in all places).

Let us first consider the statistical evidence that may lead to pundits to the view that the Spanish national soccer squad is the best in the world.

In their opening game of their 2010 World Cup campaign the Spain were beaten 1-0 by mediocre Switzerland, before beating the lowly rated ‘minnows’ Honduras 2-0 in their second game. In their third encounter in this group they overcame a somewhat average Chile to qualify for the quarter finals where they defeated Paraguay 1-0. In the semi-final they defeated Germany 1-0, and in the final, after extra time, they beat Holland by the same score. Indeed, had Holland’s Arjen Robben not missed a glaringly opportunity to score in the 62nd minute, or had the English referee Howard Webb not ignored Spain’s valid claim for a penalty for a foul by Spain’s Puyol on Holland’s Robben, and Holland’s Johnny Heitinga not sent off for an innocuous transgression on Spain’s Iniesta, or had referee Webb not erred by ignoring the legitimate claim for a corner kick to Holland, and instead awarding a kick out to Spain, from which they scored the winning goal, the title of World Champions and ‘best national team’ may well have been gone to the Dutch squad. Thus, whilst the record will show Spain won the 2010 World Cup, it must be argued that scraping narrow victories, many over poor or mediocre opponents, and others which can only be described as fortunate, is hardly evidence of a team that is deserving of the title of ‘best national soccer team in the world’.

It should also be pointed out that Spain’s style of play is not without its critics who describe it a ‘ticky tacka – a style that whilst often great to watch, can also be boring or frustrating in equal measure where players, such as Iniesta, Fabergas and Xavi, insist in trying to walk the ball into the opponents goal by executing too many passes, causing the move to fizzle out. It should also be shown that in a friendly match against Argentina on 9th September 2010, Spain were defeated 4-1, and beaten again 4-0 by Portugal on 18th November. Whilst they had earlier beaten Poland 6-0 in the previous June, South Korea 1-0 in April, and Saudi Arabia 3-2 in May, and in the current 2014 World Cup campaign Spain have only achieved a 1-0 win over a very ordinary Colombia – Such inconsistency in performances cannot be said to be the mark of a great team.

Thus, even on the basis that the Spanish team are current world champions does not qualify them to be deemed the beat national team in the world. In fact all it really means is that they gained enough points in their qualifying group to progress to the finals, and once there, they succeeded in scraping narrow and sometimes fortunate wins over opponents who, in different circumstances or with different match officials, might have gone on to win the tournament themselves. Moreover, objectively, to be worthy of the title of ‘best national team in the world’ it would have to be shown that Spain is capable of defeating each and every other national team in the world. As we have seen with the results against Switzerland, Portugal, and Argentina, the Spanish national team have not done this.

I understand that your friends’ claim of Spain as the best national team in the world may be based on their view that the tactics, overall game-plan, team formation, and individual skills of the players of the present Spanish squad meets their criteria of how soccer should be played. However, it should be said that there have been many national teams employing very different tactics etc., to which the title ‘best team in the world’ has been awarded.

One such team was the Hungarian squad of the 1950s which included many of the most revered payers of that era: Ferenc Puskas, Sanor Kocsis, Nandor Hidegkuti, Zoltan Czibor, Josef Bozsik and Gyula Grosics. Also known as the ‘Golden Team’ or the ‘Magical Magyars’, this team, managed by Gusztav Sebes, was recognised as introducing new coaching methods and tactical innovations that were adopted by many other national and club managers. In 1953, this ‘Golden Team’ astounded the football world by trouncing the England 6-3 in Wembley, the home of British football. Up until that time the WM formation was accepted as the most effective way of playing the game. This formation consisted of a centre forward, in the most advanced position, spearheading the attack of 3 forwards and 2 wingers. Sebes decided to withdraw the centre forward to the mid-field, and the wingers to the same area of the pitch whenever needed – tactics heretofore undreamt of in the history of the game. The result was that this created a more flexible 2-3-3-2 formation, allowing the team to move quickly form defence to attack. Moreover, it drew the opposition’s defenders, particularly the opposing centre half, out of position. Furthermore, where heretofore players’ roles were clearly defined, Sebes encouraged his players to be more versatile and adventurous – the ideal player, he held, should be comfortable in any position.

However, although this style of play, now entitled ‘total football, was taken up by many other coaches, its popularity was not universal, and many other national teams, such as England, still preferred the WM formation where a tall and robust centre forward, such as Nat Lofthouse of England, was served by fast and skillful wing players like Stanley Matthews or Tom Finney. Of course today we see that there is no ‘universally’ popular formation with coaches alternating between 2-3-3-2, 4-2-4, 5-4-1, often in the course of a single game.

Having seen how tactics and team formations have changed over the history of the game, we should also consider how the rules of the game have been revisited and amended over time. For example, where once the goalkeeper could only run take three steps before hopping the ball (and then he could only do this three times before being obliged to kick it), he/she can now run freely within his goal area without bouncing the ball. Also, whereas once the opposing players were allowed to shoulder charge a goalkeeper holding the ball over the goal-line (this rule was changed after the 1958 English Cup final when Nat Lofthouse, of Bolton Wanderers, barged the Manchester United ‘keeper, Harry Gregg, into the net and knocking him unconscious – in the 1957 Cup Final a similar, if not worse incident had left the united keeper Ray Wood with a broken jaw having been struck in the same manner by Aston Villa’s left-winger Peter McParland), now the goalie is the most protected player on the pitch.

Furthermore, although substitutes for injured players was introduced in the qualifying rounds of the 1954 World Cup, it was not the 1965/66 season that substitutes were not allowed in English football. Before this time teams who lost players through injury were forced to continue with whatever players remained uninjured – now, as you know up to three players can be taken off if they is playing badly, or for tactical purposes. Moreover, where once there were only three officials, the referee and two linesmen, now it is possible, in some games, to have as many as six officials: the referee, two assistant referees (or linesmen or women), a fourth official on the sideline, and an official at each end-line of the pitch. The rules on the sliding tackle has also been changed, and where once the coaches of each team were free to roam the ‘encourage’ their team from anywhere on the sideline, they are now confined to a specific ‘box’ which is supervised by the fourth official – and surely it is only a matter of time before technology similar to that used in tennis and rugby to settle questionable calls is introduced to eliminate disputes such as calls on whether the ball has crossed the goal-line, red-card issues, penalty claims by players diving in eighteen yard box, and so on.

On the above evidence it seems fair to conclude that looking for a universal standard (objective truth) against which national soccer teams approach to the game might be measured is fruitless. There is no platonic ideal form of the ‘beautiful game’. Whilst there may be some justification for looking at the evolution of the game from a Hegelian ‘dialectic process’ perspective, it seems to me that the Aristotelian view that whilst universals may derive from empirical experience, these are never to be understood as concepts or ‘truths’ that are written in stone, but as ‘general conclusions’ that have their genesis in the mind/s of the conceiver/s in accordance with his/her/their experience with the natural world. As Aristotle famously says, ‘nihil in intellectu nisi prius in sensu’ (‘there is nothing in the mind that is not first in the senses’). Thus, as already inferred, the view that there are ‘objective truths’ by which national soccer teams might be deemed worthy of the title of ‘best national team in the world’ is unsustainable.

Answer by Shaun Williamson

We are not talking about an easy objective truth here. You can tell if its raining by looking out of the window but you can’t tell which football team is best in the same way.

However just because a judgement is complex that doesn’t mean that it is impossible. Every day bookmakers have to make judgements about the relative probability of racehorses winning a particular horse races. Their judgements are based on past performance and a great number of other things, the jockey, the race distance and the strengths and weaknesses of the other horses. If a bookmaker just said there is no objective truth here, any horse could win, then he is not going to make a living as a bookmaker.

Its the same with football teams. We have to make a complex judgement but that doesn’t mean its an impossible judgement. The judgement is based on the performances of players in the team, the manger and the playing style. So for the the 2010 world cup the bookmakers and the smart money were on Spain. Spain didn’t win by accident their players and their playing style were just the best. Now of course the best team doesn’t always win, accidents play a part. However the best team will win most of the time and Spain did. That is why we say that at present Spain are the best team in the world.

Bob asked:

If ‘God’ is defined as ‘an omnipotent being’ does that mean that everything must be exactly as God wills it? Can there be limits on God other than God’s own nature?

Answer by Jürgen Lawrenz

No it doesn’t Bob. That’s simply a theological argument, based on black and white opposition. And bringing ‘will’ into it only confuses the issue. Because now you have to define what you mean by God’s will. Not forgetting that God does not have a ‘nature’ with inherent limitations. Nevertheless I get the gist of your question; but how you take the answer is up to your own ‘free will’.

Omnipotence is completely compatible with inexact knowledge. I could quote you some relevant passages from the great philosophers on this, but seeing that we live in the computer age, you may find this example (I hope) highly intuitive:

Computers are designed by engineers and programmers. These are the computer’s omnipotent gods, because the computer must execute whatever these men built into it, and it’s altogether determined. But men are not omnipotent. They are omnipotent only in relation to the potency of the computer.

Further, the programmers may not be able to foresee all the results of the computer’s operations. Yet they are still its omnipotent architects.

Finally, in this scenario you might wish to consider what would happen if you asked your computer to give you the full length of the number ‘Pi’. It can’t be done and therefore your computer will hang up. Does an omniscient God know the answer? No, because there are many things of this nature that have no answer. In fact to ask for an answer (i.e. for the complete string of ‘Pi’) is to show a limited understanding of the nature of those issues. So in the sense of your question, God could will as much as he likes to calculate ‘Pi’ down to the last decimal, but the real point here is that IT IS UNNECESSARY. The assumption of omnipotence is a fallacy to begin with, because it assumes knowledge of every detail. God does NOT NEED it. (It’s really nothing more than a purely human preoccupation).

One last comment: God’s omniscience is theologically axiomatic. It can’t be questioned (a few hundred years ago it would have cost you your life to doubt it). Philosophers are of course free to consider aspects of the question that are barred to theologians. This doesn’t mean that philosophers are happy to embrace this freedom — far from it! But it is a good philosophical position to take, that if anyone tells you ‘omnipotence’ means total and in detail, you ask for proof and for examples. You might then discover that the other person doesn’t have either.

Nastik asked:

Suppose someone objected, If philosophy is ongoing process, what’s the point of engaging in it? You’ll never get any certain answers; your search will never end. Such a prospect is thoroughly depressing. How would you respond to this criticism?

Answer by Shaun Williamson

Well I have never thought that philosophy is an ongoing process, if it were I would have no interest in it. For me philosophy has always been about the ruthless pursuit of the truth and I have always been convinced that that this truth is obtainable.

However there are many things we pursue in life that we may never reach. An artist may try to paint the perfect picture, a mathematician may spend his life trying to prove the Riemann hypothesis but may never manage to complete the proof. In the same way a philosopher might spend his life in pursuit of the truth but may never reach it.

Philosophy has always been about the pursuit of rational truth. Anyone who thinks that such truth is unobtainable should give up philosophy.

Saying that philosophy is an ongoing process is the same as saying that philosophical truth does not exist and this implies that philosophy does not exist.

Of course philosophical truth does exist and you can reach if you really want to but it isn’t easy.