Finnegan asked:

What is metaphysics for a contemporary philosopher? Is there agreement that it is still considered a valid field of inquiry within contemporary philosophy?

Answer by Jürgen Lawrenz

With all due respects to prevailing opinions on metaphysics, I’m going to be so brash as to say that most post-Aristotelian metaphysics is not metaphysics at all, but merely a philosophical veneer for theology, mysticism, spiritualism and other pursuits of this ilk. Under those terms it is easy to agree with anyone who calls it a waste of time (starting, incidentally, with Thomas Hobbes in his Leviathan).

Let us therefore consider the meaning of the word! What is meta and what is physics, and how come they were compounded?

Well now: We all know what physics is, i.e. study of the physical world with a view to framing theories of “What is?”. Hence matter, energy, thermodynamics etc., some of which is amenable to being turned into technology. No issues.

What about “meta”? It means “with”, “after”, “around”, “belonging to” in some ways. Take note now: as combined, these words spell out that metaphysics is something that is in some way copulated with physics, but is not physics in itself.

So much for meaning. I think you (or anyone) would now have difficulty puzzling out where gods and angels, ghosts and witches fit in! Even for those believe(d) in them, they are exactly the opposite of what physics is concerned with.

But then, what is “meta”-physics really?

Answer: They are items that belong to physics, but are not existents. Such as: Cause, beginning, end, force, fundamental principle, element, necessity, contingency, substance, being, identity, difference, potential, quality, relation, limit etc etc. All these can be found in Aristotle’s “Philosophical Lexicon”, that is part of his book on Metaphysics. Today, this kind of research is called “Theoretical Physics”; but as you can see, it is metaphysics – the real metaphysics.

The philosophical discipline which goes under the same name is simply a hangover from the scholastic era when everyone, including theologians, firmly believed in the actual existence of spirit beings of all kinds; they believed moreover that earthly existence is not real and that physical existents were mere phenomena. Yet it is on these terms that the word “metaphysics” is still misconstrued, although for philosophers, even academics, there was certainly no warrant to persist with it for at least the last 200 years.

After this explanation, you might usefully approach your question from a different angle. Metaphysics is neither theology nor mysticism; therefore the pseudo-metaphysics targeted by your question has no place in modern philosophy. But the genuine article still has relevance, because its agenda is wider than theoretical physics alone; and you would not wish to dismiss the idea that Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Adorno, even Whitehead still made significant contributions to it. They are indeed heirs of the great metaphysical systems of the 19th century (Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer et al.), which finally linked up again with the authentic metaphysics of the men from Thales to Aristotle, and Descartes to Leibniz.

My hope is, that you may now feel an urge to correct your inadvertent misuse of a philosophical nomenclature and seriously involve yourself with some of the finest and most far-reaching accomplishments of the human mind in history, to which the title ‘metaphysics’ is attached with full justice.

Finnegan asked:

What is metaphysics for a contemporary philosopher? Is there agreement that it is still considered a valid field of inquiry within contemporary philosophy?

Answer by Peter Jones

Metaphysics is the same subject that it was on the day it was named and always will be. Among contemporary philosophers there are two schools of thought.

For the professional academic metaphysics is incomprehensible and a waste of time. This renders the whole of professional academic philosophy incomprehensible and a waste of time. This is made clear in the current edition of the Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics where metaphysics is described as unscientific, inconclusive and absent any decision-making procedure. Most philosophers of the Academy ignore metaphysics and form their opinions on philosophical issues as suits them.

For philosophers who take it seriously metaphysics is not merely a valid field of enquiry but the most important and valuable of all fields, If we do not understand metaphysics then for us philosophy must be a muddle of competing unworkable theories and inadequate conjectures. Thus Kant calls academic metaphysics an ‘arena for mock fights’.

The second school of thought would say that metaphysics is comprehensible and has an excellent system for making decisions and arriving at firm conclusions. This school is called the Perennial philosophy. It explains metaphysics and claims it is comprehensible. This school would include Plotinus, Nagarjuna, Lao Tsu, Francis Bradley, D. E. Harding, George Spencer Brown, Sri Aurobindo and a long list of others who are ignored in the philosophy department. As it would also include me I’ll offer as link to my writings on this topic. You might like the essay ‘Is Metaphysics a Waste of Time?’ https://philpeople.org/profiles/peter-g-jones.

To the question of whether metaphysics is considered a valid field of enquiry, then, there will be different answers depending on who you ask. Russell and Carnap would say not and it is difficult to think of any contemporary scientists who believe otherwise. It is not much easier to think of contemporary scholastic philosophers who believe otherwise. The Blackwell Guide states clearly that it is not a valid field.

The reason for this is that metaphysics is incomprehensible unless we assume that mysticism, specifically non-dualism,  is its correct solution. As a consequence, all philosophers who reject mysticism find metaphysics a hopeless and inconclusive area of study and so they often reject metaphysics as well. Meanwhile all metaphysical problems are solved by Nagarjuna in the second century in his Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way for a position known as the ‘Middle Way’, non-dualism, advaita, the perennial philosophy or mysticism. Those who endorse this view would argue that metaphysics is the way to unlock the secrets of the Cosmos. It’s your choice who to believe, but logic is on the side of Nagarjuna and Lao Tsu.

Thus we have two distinct global traditions of philosophy, one for which metaphysics is incomprehensible and a waste of time and one for which it is a path to truth and understanding. This means an uncontroversial answer to your question is not possible, It has to be you who decides which is the correct view.

Gary asked:

For a while now I can’t work out where, when I’m speaking out loud, the words come from; it seems like magic. The words come out without my knowing where they originate. They seem to emerge out of nowhere, even when I’m having a normal conversation.

When I want to think, I think in English (my only language), and I can comprehend what I’m saying to myself (obviously?). I’ve successfully ‘gagged’ my internal voice and when I do so, I can’t think. I can see pictures and have feelings, but no more. Perhaps like meditation? This is worrying me a little because it feels that ‘I’ am not in control — something is living my life for me and ‘I’ am merely an observer. I’m sure I’m not mad — can you enlighten me?

Answer by Peter Jones

As you seem to have already surmised, you ask a question that leads you straight into the depths of Yoga and meditation. Stilling the inner voice is a goal and a benefit. You say that when it is stilled you see pictures and have feelings, but the meditator will want to transcend these as well.

Fear not, you are not mad, or not obviously so, for thinking that someone else is living your life and you are just observing. The topic is too extensive for a simple answer but here’s an extract from The Ultimate Understanding by Ramesh Balsekar.  It may not make immediate sense but you’ll see the connection.

“Living volitionally, with volition, with a sense of personal doership, is the bondage. Would, therefore, living non-volitionally be the way in which the sage lives? But the doing and the not-doing — the positive doing and the negative not-doing — are both aspects of ‘doing’.  How then can the sage be said to be living non-volitionally? Perhaps the more accurate description would be that the sage is totally aware that he does not live his life (either volitionally or non-volitionally) but that his life — and everyone else’s life — is being lived.”

What this means is that no one can live volitionally or otherwise; that, indeed, ‘volition’ is the essence of the ‘ego’, an expression of the ‘me’ concept, created by ‘divine hypnosis’ so that the ‘lila’ of life can happen. It is this ‘volition’ or sense of personal doership in the subjective chain of cause-and-effect which produces satisfaction or frustration in the conceptual individual.

Again, what this means is that it is a joke to believe that you are supposed to give up volition as an act of volition! ‘Let go’ — who is to let go? The ‘letting-go’ can only happen as a result of the clear understanding of the difference between what-we-are and what-we-appear-to-be. And then, non-volitional life or being-lived naturally becomes wu wei, spontaneous living, living without the unnecessary burden of volition. Why carry your luggage when you are being transported in a vehicle?”

I hope the connection with your question will be apparent. For a deeper understanding of this view and the meaning of this feeling you have that your life is being lived while ‘you’ simply observe  you would need to study mysticism.

For the full story you could try Krishna Prem’s commentary on the Bhagavad Gita. This would be diving in at the deep end. To just get your toes wet you could try any introduction to Buddhist doctrine. If you search on YouTube for teachers of non-dualism  there are many relevant talks.and interviews. Rupert Spira, Mooji and Sadhguru would be three good examples and all talk about the issue you are asking about. For a gentle introduction you could try Carlos Castenada’s entertaining series of stories about his meetings with his teacher Don Juan, who spends much time persuading Carlos to still his inner voice and learn to live without it.

The only way you’ll get to the bottom of this issue is to study it by way of meditation since being told about it is not really much help, but there is a vast literature explaining that what we usually think of as ‘me’ is not ‘me’ at all but a fiction, while it is the observer who is non-fictional. This is the Perennial philosophy, and the Enneads of Plotinus would be as good a place to start as any.

It’s a fascinating, exciting and life-changing area of research. Good luck with it.

Lucy asked:

I was reading about the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. I don’t know if I just read it wrong but to be he comes across as someone who agrees with solipsism. What is your opinion?

Answer by Martin Jenkins

Lucy, I entirely sympathise with your question!! It is entirely understandable to read Fichte as proffering a variant of solipsism. I often used to struggle with the same issue.

Confusingly, in the first section of the Science of Knowledge, ‘Foundation of Theoretical Knowledge’, Fichte frequently uses the terms ‘Absolute Self’ and ‘Consciousness’. This concerns the synthesis of the Transcendental Categories to empirical Intuitions. This is achieved by a dialectic between the Absolute Self and Non-Self. This occurs unconsciously. It is how our perception of the world happens and it is happening now, as you read this answer.

In the second part of the Science of Knowledge, ‘Foundation of Knowledge of the Practical’, the ‘Intelligent Self’ is discussed. This is how the Self becomes aware of itself. The infinite striving of the Absolute Self encounters opposition with the Not-Self. The latter limits the former. Instead of striving outwards, the Absolute Self now strives inwards, concentrating on the finite Self. The intermediation with the Non-Self furnishes knowledge of it and importantly, knowledge of the finite Self itself.

On this basis, a conclusion of solipsism could be drawn.

However, an aspect of the Non-Self that limits the finite Self is of course, another Self or selves. Admittedly, this is not discussed in the ‘Science’ but, is discussed at greater length in Fichte’s later work ‘Foundations of Natural Right’. (1797). Here, the Second Theorem states:

“The finite, rational being cannot ascribe to itself a free efficacy in the sensible world without ascribing itself to others and thus, without also presupposing the existence of other finite rational beings outside of itself.” (P. 29 ibid)

In other words, the finite self can only become self-conscious of itself in the presence of other, finite selves. Any awareness of a self presupposes other selves, the social ‘We’ precedes the individual ‘I’. This obviously rules out allegations of Solipsism.

Fichte’s account of self-consciousness and others is elaborated upon and developed in the second section of FWJ Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) and both chapters on ‘Consciousness’ and ‘Self-Consciousness’ in GWF Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).

Hope this is of use Lucy.

Minnie asked:

Why is there something instead of nothing? Is this a profound question or is it as Richard Dawkins maintains a “senseless question”?

Answer by Jürgen Lawrenz

I’m not surprised that a scientific dogmatist would wave off a truly profound issue like this, and Dawkins is by no means the first. When Leibniz put the question up, he was of course committed to putting God in the picture — why did God create an imperfect world instead of just enjoying his own perfection? And his answer (leaning on a prior formulation by the little-known early scholastic thinker John Scotus Erigena) was this: A single existent in the universe would not know that it exists, because it has nothing to compare existence with non-existence! And so Leibniz’s answer was considerably more sophisticated than our own pretty infantile supposition of a ‘big bang’: God created a kind of ‘cosmic dust’ as an analogue of himself, which we might conceive of as fundamental particles, each a mirror of the universe from its unique perspective. This can be readily translated into modern diction, as these particles comprise the underlying texture of the universe in his as well as our cosmological theories.

Leibniz called these particles ‘monads’; but the crucial difference to our present conceptions is, that his monads possess the potential, each in varying degrees, of animate and inanimate existence; and it is the manner of their congregation that results in the furniture of the world — predominantly inert monads comprising physics matter; predominantly active monads comprising the animate partition. Take note that this pathway is closed to Big Bang theorists!

Now you might cry out, “but this is metaphysics, not science!” Not so fast! Because you must not assume that any theory that happens to be the current paradigm, reigns in uncontested splendour throughout the scientific establishment.

Take Prigogine’s suggestion that in an otherwise empty universe, there must be a residual electric potential imbued with positive and negative charge from which matter can precipitate, as otherwise nothing will ever come into existence. Any now any such precipitate changes the constitution of this charged field and results in the potentiation of an accelerating cascade of further precipitations.

Although this thesis was offered by a scientist (indeed a double Nobelist), it is also pure metaphysics. But we cannot get around it; metaphysics is our only speculative methodology if we wish to find logically tight and scientifically sound theses on origins. I hope you can see from my description that Leibniz and Prigogine are not talking past each other, but propound much the same idea. For although Leibniz pays constant lip service to the theological presuppositions in his era, he occasionally lifted the lid on his own thoughts in private communications, as in this case in a letter to Johann Bernoulli, where he said: “God did not create the world — he created monads, and the monads created the world.”

This is not the place for me to go deeper into these conundrums. But a word is indispensable on why this is an issue of the utmost profundity to minds attuned to philosophy. Consider that the question refers to the fact that without life in the universe — especially intelligent life — there would be no-one to testify to its existence. Virtually all other philosophical questions, and all scientific questions as well, hinge on it. The existence of the universe is predicated a priori on there being life, as in a universe without this potential it would be indifferent whether it exists or not. So Leibniz’s question is a direct challenge to the mindless presupposition “here it is, basta!” and further to the asinine assumption that life is nothing more than a chance configuration of molecular products which we just happen to incapable of explaining in scientific terms. But also, as we saw, to the naive belief that a God may be said to exist without humans to posit such a Being as a possibility and then to cast doubt upon it.

To my mind, Leibniz holds an advantage in these stakes. His monadic cosmos unfurls with the potential for life as a residual capacity. He answers the second prong of the “existential question” by providing a pathway for the evolution of agency, intentionality, perception, awareness, intelligence etc., which tends to be ignored or confused by committed material monists like Dawkins. Leibniz knew nothing of evolution, of course; but as it turns out, it is the most exquisite argument in his favour that only intentional agents possess the wherewithal to legitimise the question under consideration here.

(See https://askaphilosopher.org/2017/05/08/why-is-there-something-rather-than-nothing-2/)

Lucy asked:

I was reading about the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte. I don’t know if I just read it wrong but to be he comes across as someone who agrees with solipsism. What is your opinion?

Answer by Jürgen Lawrenz

If you don’t supply a source of your reading, I can’t judge whether you or your source is in error. In fact, Fichte is the opposite of a solipsist; he tries to explain what it takes to furnish a mind with knowledge through experience. This can sound like a kind of solipsism to a careless reader, as he insists (rightly of course) that the contents of my mind cannot be the same as yours. If you fly over a mountain, you will naturally have a different perception of it than someone who climbs it from the bottom up. That’s the upshot of his take on individuality, which is what his philosophy seeks to establish. Even so, the sum of many such different perspectives can (and usually will) result in a consensus of opinion; although by the same token each one of us also has private experiences which we do not share.

That’s the nutshell response to your nutshell question. Of course, Fichte’s philosophy goes much deeper; but that’s for you to discover.