Christopher asked:

We say that faith is unjustified, but don’t we have faith in reason and logic? We always base our beliefs, which we consider to be true, on our past experiences and we assume (i.e. have faith) that our future/ present experiences will be similar. We believe that if we drop a pencil it will fall because that is what has always happened, and it still takes faith to believe it will happen again. If this is true then what can we base our knowledge on?

I’m aware of Descartes proof of the existence of the self, but even this can only be true if reason itself is infallible, which I seriously doubt. A philosopher once showed that motion is an illusion using reason and logic. Paradoxes exist. We have numbers that are non-repeating and nonterminating, yet correspond to something finite and material. I’m using reason to show that reason is infallible and if the rules of reason imply that reason is unreasonable (untrue) then something seems to be wrong. Am I right?

Answer by Craig Skinner

Your question bears on the ‘epistemological turn’ in philosophy which began with Descartes, continued through Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Kant, and was reinvigorated by Gettier and Quine fifty years ago.

You are right about one thing. We can have no absolutely certain knowledge. Ultimately we base our beliefs on reason or perception. Both can be faulty, and we can’t prove that either produces true beliefs. Reason can only be justified by reason, a circular argument which Descartes is guilty of using, as you say

But this doesn’t mean it is unreasonable to rely on our considered beliefs, or that they are wrong. Most of them may well be right. It’s just that we can’t prove them, so that, as you say, we are fallible, we must live by faith (understood as reasonable assumption not as blind faith going against all evidence)

Let’s briefly consider induction, reason and perception.

First, induction. Yes, it takes faith to believe the pencil will fall next time I drop it. So what. The whole of nature relies on induction in the sense that past regularities are hardwired into genes and brains. Right now the tree in my garden is shedding its leaves, in anticipation of winter, and in a few months, will sprout new ones, in anticipation of summer. My dog is looking at me expectantly as the time for her walk draws near. And I don’t think the tree or the dog will be disappointed. Of course, As Hume says, we can’t justify the necessity postulated by causation or laws of nature, and so can’t be sure the future will be like the past. Moreover, even if we do accept a necessary connexion between constantly conjoined events, this has only been up to now, and we can’t be sure it will hold in the future. But it is still reasonable to rely on it, we all do, we can’t do otherwise, as Hume himself says.

As for reason, there has been a traditional presumption in philosophy that truths of reason (analytic, necessary, apriori), although not telling us anything about the world, are especially reliable. Whereas, truths arrived at by observation (contingent, a posteriori), although telling us about the world, are less reliable. I suggest that because neither reason nor perception can ultimately be justified, all truths are on a par. On this I side with Thomas Reid and Quine. As Reid says:

‘Why, sir, should I believe the faculty of reason more than that of perception? – they came both out of the same shop, and were made by the same artist: if he puts one piece of false ware into my hands, what should hinder him from putting another?’ (Reid T [1764]: An Enquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense).

Reid’s point holds whether we regard (with Descartes) the ‘artist’ as God, or (with Hume and Darwin) as nature

As for perception, as I say (with Reid, Moore and Quine), it is on a par with reason. To be sure, we can’t PROVE the external world exists. But (as GE Moore said, and illustrated by his notorious ‘hands’ argument), we don’t know about things in the external world by proof, we know about them by perception.

So, I go for a moderate, wide, foundational, naturalistic epistemology: moderate, in that I am content with fallible knowledge; wide in that I know of an external world, other minds and moral truths; foundational in that my belief system is supported by basic beliefs founded on reason and perception; naturalistic in that I think evolution has seen to it that my perception and reason are generally reliable.

Finally, I wont deal here with paradoxes of motion or issues to do with irrational numbers, except to say that I think any paradoxes arising are only apparent logic inconsistencies, not real ones when considered in depth (Achilles is not really still chasing that tortoise!). So, I don’t think ‘the rules of reason imply that reason is unreasonable (untrue)’ as you put it.

Craig Skinner at PhiloSophos.com

Bill asked:

I am not a philosopher or educated in philosophy, but I like to break what I observe around me down into common factors.

Isn’t everything reducible to motion? And if so, wouldn’t that mean that every property or attribute which constitutes the nature of anything is nothing more then various velocities contrasted or interacting with one another?

Answer by Jürgen Lawrenz

There is such a philosopher. His name is Leibniz and his theory of the monads is fundamentally the explanation of the force which lies at the bottom of all reality. Simplifying his thought: It is nonsensical to suppose a ‘container’ (space) with nothing in it. Likewise it is impossible to speak sensibly of time without something happening. ‘A thing exists where and when it acts’. Accordingly all things (past, present and future) exist in two relationships to each other, namely their relative mutual succession and their relative mutual orientation. But this can only be discerned in terms of changing temporal and spatial arrangements, i.e. their motions. These motions are therefore the ultimate source of time and space. But the motions obviously imply some force, so it is a conception of universal (or residual) force we get from Leibniz.

The problem for you might now be that following up your idea with reading Leibniz is more difficult than with other philosophers. He did not write a book on the subject – in fact most of his philosophical writings are letters and essays, so that finding and compiling the relevant texts is a pretty taxing job. To date, no editor of Leibniz seems to have seen fit to collect them all in one publication.

So you have basically two ways to find your entry into this literature. Get yourself a fat book of his papers, e.g. Philosophical Papers and Letters, edited by Loemker; or Philosophical Writings, edited by Parkinson and find what you need. This is likely to be frustrating. The alternative is to read my comprehensive account of Leibniz’s theory. Check it out here.

Jürgen Lawrenz at PhiloSophos.com

Kim asked:

What is a metaphysical explanation of a phenomenon?

Answer by Geoffrey Klempner

Your question contains two claims about metaphysics: both of them controversial.

The first claim is that metaphysics is concerned with giving explanations. Just as physics explains why the Earth goes round the Sun, or chemistry explains why copper dissolves in concentrated nitric acid, so metaphysics explains… what exactly?

The second claim is that metaphysics is interested in phenomena, that is to say, particlar things we experience, or discover about the world. Once upon a time, it was believed that earthquakes were caused by an angry god. Now, the accepted explanation is given by geology and the tectonic structure of the Earth.

Pick any phenomenon you like, and you will find a science to explain it, assuming it is capable of explanation. I wouldn’t like to be in the position of defending the view that some phenomena are intrinsically inexplicable, although there are many that we don’t yet know how to explain.

You can see the problem. One answer that has been given assumes that metaphysics does explain, but what it explains isn’t any particular phenomenon in the world. What metaphysics explains is the very existence of the world itself. A proof of the existence of God would be a ‘metaphysical’ explanation of the existence of the world. As a metaphysical proof, it doesn’t rely on empirical observations of phenomena, the way science does.

Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason argued that none of the ‘proofs’ of the existence of God are valid. All we can prove is the validity of principles, such as the principle of causality or the principle of the permanence of substance, which he regarded as a necessary condition for human experience. These principles apply to all phenomena equally, rather than to any particular phenomenon in the world. You could say that according to Kant, metaphysics explains the ‘phenomenon of causality’.

An alternative approach would be that metaphysics doesn’t offer explanations of any kind, although it is concerned with phenomena. What metaphysics seeks to do is describe phenomena, or offer a general framework for description, at a greater level of generality than is normally required for everyday life, or for science.

This is the view that I hold. What kinds of phenomena is metaphysics interested in? One example would be the question of what it is to be a subject of experience in a world, or what it is to be ‘I’. Chemistry, biology, psychology all contribute to our understanding of what human beings are, how we function as a part of nature. I am one of these human beings. What kind of ‘phenomenon’ is the experience of being ‘I’? It’s the most real phenomenon to me, but when I try to describe it, all I am able to describe are everyday facts about what it is to be a human being.

Metaphysics as I have just characterized it – which is interested in particular phenomena but not in explanation – doesn’t look a good candidate for a ‘science’. What metaphysics aims to do is to see what is already there, but from a greater height or a greater angle of view. We already know the basic truths of metaphysics, and yet we don’t know.

A truth of metaphysics is like the elephant in the room which we don’t notice because it is always there, or the wood we fail to see for the trees.

http://www.philosophypathways.com/vita.html

Craig asked:

While I understand the reluctance to allow anyone to answer questions on Pathways, and very informative it is, the simple question of academic qualification is a little strange. My question is does the study of philosophy create a philosopher or is it the random thoughts of a simple mind asking the most basic and important questions, then formulating the most striking and thought provoking answers.

Answer by Shaun Williamson

Craig suppose you find a website called ‘Ask a doctor?’ and you post a question there. You would probably expect your question to be answered by someone who had a medical degree from a recognised medical school. You would feel cheated if the person who answered your question had no medical qualifications.

Suppose you find a website called ‘Ask a Psychic’ and you post a question. Well psychics are self appointed and there is no evidence that any of them are genuine so you would have to take what you get from such a website.

Suppose you find a site called ‘Ask a philosopher’ then your question will be answered by people who have some academic qualifications in philosophy. They may not be great philosophers, they may not even be good philosophers but at least they have taken the trouble to study philosophy. Now in general philosophy does not lead to lucrative jobs or great riches. People who study philosophy do so because they want to.

You seem to think that philosophy is about sitting around having deep thoughts about life. It isn’t and academic philosophers have no interest in such things. We have no interest in striking thoughts or simple minds with their thought provoking answers. We have no interest in such things because we are philosophers and we are only interested in philosophy. Philosophy is the continuation of something that first arose in ancient Greece more than two thousand years ago. It is a rational inquiry into the nature of truth, the scope of human knowledge and nature of logic.

I know that in general the word philosophy means the most basic and fundamental ideas about things but it doesn’t mean this to us academic philosophers. So in an agricultural college they might talk about the philosophy of animal husbandry and in medical or nursing schools they might talk about the philosophy of patient care. Neither of these things are dealt with in the university philosophy departments.

You can become a philosopher without going to university but you have to read all the books and you have to study logic and you have to understand the books. When you have read all the books then you are ready to have your own original deep thoughts. Qualifications or book reading don’t make you a philosopher but they are a necessary stage on the road to becoming a philosopher.

I would contend that the most thought provoking questions and answers about life have been provided by the academic philosophers and not by simple minds sitting around waiting to have deep thoughts. Philosophers aren’t interested in deep thoughts we are interested in rational thoughts supported by logical rational arguments.

If you can’t be bothered to study the work of past philosophers, how will you know that your questions and answers are thought provoking and worthwhile. They might be shallow and worthless. or a mere repetition of work that has already been done.

Now I am sure that you will understand that we are not Psychics and we can’t allow just anyone who claims to be a deep thinker to answer questions on this website. We can’t set exams to find out who is really a deep thinker. Universities already do this. Their exams are called philosophy degrees.

Shaun Williamson developed the Ask a Philosopher cgi script question.pl. He did his postgraduate studies on the philosophy of Wittgenstein.

Answer by Jürgen Lawrenz

Study of philosophy does not create a philosopher. Academic qualifications have very little to do with it anyway. The academic pursuit of philosophy can have one of two targets: First, that the person may wish to pursue philosophy for the sake of getting a job in an institution. That’s common, and applies in exactly the same way to doctors, engineers, economists, lawyers and many other professions. These people, in other words, end up as teachers of philosophy, or as researchers into the history of philosophy. There is no reason to believe that they are philosophers, although a few undoubtedly end up that way.

The other reason to submit to academic study is that philosophy is not just a pack of personal opinions. Philosophical thought tries to find ways of making meaningful and long lasting contribution to the self-understanding of human beings, not only for thinking, but for political theory, for examining scientific principles and so on. For these purpose it is necessary to acquire a rigorous discipline of thinking. Academic study has a way of enforcing that discipline.

Jürgen Lawrenz at PhiloSophos.com

Lashiya asked:

Can our feelings be our sole guide to morality?

Answer by Stuart Burns

The answer to your question depends entirely on just how you choose to think about ‘morality’. In general, the answer is ‘No!’. But there is a possible ‘Yes!’ waiting in the wings.

According to many different surveys, most of the people on this planet self-describe themselves as ‘religious’ to some extent or other. What this means is that most people would self-describe themselves as adhering to a religious notion of morality – otherwise known as Authoritative Rule morality. And what that means, in turn, is that they supposedly think (or perhaps, more accurately, they want other people to think they think) that what determines whether some action is moral or immoral is the dictates of some Authority figure. For example, for those avowing adherence to the Judeo-Christian-Islamic religious faiths, that Authority figure would be God – with His dictates revealed in the sacred books of those faiths. There are lots of other religions in the world, and many quasi-religions. An example of the latter would be traditional Communism whose Authority figures include Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao (and perhaps Che Guevara).

The point of this initial focus on Authoritative Rule morality, is that most people, most of the time, think (or pretend they think) of the notion of morality in Authoritative Rule terms. And the thing is that all Authoritative Rule morality is couched in terms of absolute commandments – You must to this, you must not do that. The obvious example is the Ten Commandments – ‘Thou Shalt Not Kill!!’ – No if, ands, or buts!! No allowance for circumstances. If this is the way that you think of morality, then the answer to your question is clearly ‘No!!’ Whatever your feelings might be, they cannot be your sole guide to morality. If you are ‘brought up right’, then your feelings ought to be in sync with the dictates of your morality. But your primary guide is necessarily the received Word of the Authority figure you have chosen.

On the other hand, regardless of what people say they believe, most people do not in fact actually adhere to the strict commandments of their religious notions of morality. In other words, most people most of the time actually behave as if they believed in a much less dogmatic notion of morality. And now we get into the possibility of a consequentialist notion of morality.

There are any number of different consequentialist notions of morality to choose from, if you wish to investigate and choose one that suits you. But all of them, by their very nature, consider the benefits and harm that actions might do to people. What separates the various members of the consequentialist group of moral theories, is the kind of things that are considered benefits and harm, and the scope of people for whom consideration is morally required.

Consider Utilitarianism, as one famous example. There are a number of different flavours of Utilitarianism available to choose from, but the ‘traditional’ version, due to Bentham and Mill, determines the moral worth of actions according to the extent to which they deliver the ‘greatest happiness to the greatest number’. In any situation, therefore, the obligatory moral action is the alternative that you expect to deliver the net greatest happiness – over all time, and over all people. Different flavours of Utilitarianism modify this principle by changing ‘happiness’ to some other notion like ‘economic welfare’, or ‘flourishing’, and so forth. They also sometimes change the time and population scopes to reduce the computation to more manageable levels.

Regardless of the details, if you choose to think of ‘morality’ along consequentialist lines, then the answer to your question is also clearly ‘No!!’. Consequentialist notions of morality make the beneficial and harmful consequences of actions of paramount importance in judging their moral worth. Your feelings about the matter are irrelevant. Although, again, if you are ‘brought up right’, then your feelings ought to be in sync with the dictates of your morality. (The very definition of being ‘brought up right’.) But your primary guide is necessarily the notion of the Greatest Good that your chosen version of a consequentialist morality has deemed morally supreme.

Unfortunately, all consequentialist notions of morality put a strong moral emphasis on knowledge and thinking. You have to learn enough about the workings of the world to both be able to recognize what alternatives for action (or inaction) you have available in any circumstance, and be able to predict with reasonable accuracy the consequences of those alternatives. And, of course, you have to pay attention to your circumstances, and think (hard) about those possible consequences. A consequentialist notion of morality is not for the lazy. And feelings just get in the way of careful attention to detail. But look around you and you will see that when it comes to morality, most people are willfully lazy. They would much rather have someone else do their moral thinking for them. Or they would much rather ‘go with the flow’.

So if you don’t like the consequences-be-damned absoluteness of an Authoritative Rule morality, and you don’t like the effort demanded by a Consequentialist morality, there is an alternative. It’s called ‘Cultural Relativism’. The basic idea here is that what identifies actions as moral or immoral is the subjective opinion of a population. Morality is what a population says it is. If a population thinks that a particular act is moral or immoral, then it is. Of course, you are faced with the problem of figuring out just what the opinion is of the population of you have chosen. And you are faced with the challenge of choosing which population you are going to let set your moral standards. You can go all the way from ‘all human beings’ down to ‘myself alone’. There is no moral principle that will let you decide where on this scale you ‘should’ draw the line. It’s all subjective opinion anyway. Unless you choose to limit the population to yourself alone – what’s called ‘Subjectivist Ethics’ – then your own feelings are almost as irrelevant as with other forms of morality. You are, after all, only one opinion amongst many. Baring Subjectivist Ethics, if you think of ‘morality’ in a Cultural Relativist way, then the answer to your question is equally ‘No!!’ Your primary guide to morality (considered in a Cultural Relativist way), is the opinions (or feelings, if you wish) of your chosen population – assuming you can figure out just what those opinions actually are.

Only if you limit the relevant population of concern to yourself alone – choose to adopt Subjectivist Ethics – can you argue that your sole guide to morality is your feelings. But just remember, the problem with Subjectivist Ethics, as with all variations of Cultural Relativist Morality, is that you have no basis from which to disagree with anyone whose ‘feelings’ are different from those of your own. Morality comes down to a matter of taste. If I like pistachio ice cream and you don’t, neither opinion can be right or wrong. Any disagreement about what we are to have for dessert will necessarily be resolved on the basis of force of personality or force of arms. No reasoned debate is possible.

So there you have it. The general answer to your question is ‘No!’ Under most conceptions of morality, your feelings are not a proper guide to morality. Only if you choose to adopt Subjectivist Ethics can you argue that your feelings have any relevance.

http://www3.sympatico.ca/saburns/pg00cv.htm

Emmaculatha asked:

How would you distinguish between a person who is being philosophical in the popular sense of the word and the one who might justifiably qualify for the title philosopher?

Answer by Shaun Williamson

Very easy really. Anybody can be philosophical but the philosopher is the one who has studied philosophy and read all the books. If you can’t be bothered to read the books you are not a philosopher. Reading all the books will not make you a great philosopher, it may not even make you a good philosopher but at least you are justified in calling yourself a philosopher.

Shaun Williamson developed the Ask a Philosopher cgi script question.pl. He did his postgraduate studies on the philosophy of Wittgenstein.

Answer by Geoffrey Klempner

What is it to ‘qualify for a title’? Consider the circumstances in which this question arises. You want to know if someone qualifies for the title of ‘medical doctor’. You are putting your life in someone’s hands, and most countries have laws which state the appropriate criteria for calling oneself a ‘doctor’ and practising medicine.

Or consider what is required to be a ‘teacher’. In the UK, state schools will only employ people who have a teaching qualification, i.e. someone who has taken a teaching degree or postgraduate certificate. Non-state schools, like the great public schools of Harrow or Eton, don’t always have this requirement. They set other criteria, but don’t consider a teaching qualification to be necessary. For example, to teach French, or History, you have to have a degree in that subject. If you really know your subject, then the assumption is you can teach it.

By contrast with these two cases, there are no criteria for qualifying for the title ‘philosopher’. It implies that the holder is worthy in some way, but how? It is important to be doctored by a ‘real doctor’ or taught by a ‘real teacher’. No country has a law stating who can or cannot be called a ‘philosopher’.

It’s a label, originally self-applied, devised at a time – in Ancient Greece – when thinking about general questions such as the nature of the universe was considered suspect or even dangerous. If you were against ‘philosophers’, the lovers of wisdom, then you were ‘against wisdom’, i.e. ignorant or stupid.

Is everyone who is philosophical a philosopher? It is good to be philosophical, to ponder the great questions or think about things more deeply. A philosopher is something that one aspires to be, which implies that considerable effort is involved. To be a philosopher is a vocation. If you are prepared to dedicate a significant portion of your life to the study of philosophy, even if you don’t earn a living as a teacher of philosophy, then you have every right to call yourself a philosopher.

http://www.philosophypathways.com/vita.html