Christopher asked:

Are there any good arguments for not having free will other than lack of evidence for it and that it doesn’t conform to how the rest of the universe works? I do not believe in free will, per se, but I believe that there is something there that is the driving force behind voluntary action. I say I don’t believe in free will because I believe that this ‘something’ is not free, it cannot ‘choose’ unbiasedly, it is influenced by the external physical world (sensation and perception) as well as the internal physical world (pain, hunger, thirst, ‘instinct’). What I find to be so compelling to believe that there is ‘something’ is the fact that I can do things like hold my breath or think about a subject on command.

Now how long I hold my breath is determined physically, (I’ve been told that it is impossible to hold your breath until you die) and how I think about the subject is determined by my personal beliefs, but there is a small window that some sort of ‘will’ comes into play between where the ‘decision’ starts and the ‘limitations’ begin. I realize that both of the previously mentioned actions need to be learned before they can be performed, but I’m not sure how or if learning is involved in the problem of free will. I’m also very interested in consciousness and somehow ‘intuitively’ feel that the two are dependent on each other, probably that free will is a quality of, or arises from consciousness, but I’m at a dead end there too. Any ideas?

Answer by Peter Jones

Hello Christopher.

You ask some interesting questions. I don’t think this one can be answered except by a long essay, but below are two quotations that might give you food for thought. For the view these represent the freewill-determinism debate would be caused by a misunderstanding, and the two horns of the dilemma may be ‘sublated’ for the truth.

First is Ramesh Balsekar giving the meaning of ‘Wu Wei’ or non-volitional living, from his book The Ultimate Understanding:

Living volitionally, with volition, with a sense of personal doer-ship, is the bondage. Would, therefore, living non-volitionally be the way in which the sage lives? But the doing and the not-doing – the positive doing and the negative not-doing – are both aspects of ‘doing’. How then can the sage be said to be living non-volitionally? Perhaps the more accurate description would be that the sage is totally aware that he does not live his life (either volitionally or non-volitionally) but that his life – and everyone else’s life – is being lived.

Again, what this means is that it is a joke to believe that you are supposed to give up volition as an act of volition! ‘Let go’ – who is to let go? The ‘letting-go’ can only happen as a result of the clear understanding of the difference between what-we-are and what-we-appear-to-be. And then, non-volitional life or being-lived naturally becomes wu wei, spontaneous living, living without the unnecessary burden of volition. Why carry your luggage when you are being transported in a vehicle?

And here is Gurdjieff putting the same view differently, in an extract from P.D. Ouspensky, Conversation with Gurdjieff. In Search of the Miraculous – Fragments of an Unknown Teaching):

I asked G. what a man had to do to assimilate this teaching.

‘That is another question. In order to do it is necessary to be. And it is necessary first to understand what to be means.’

Food for thought at least.

You may not find this view amenable but you’ll see that it represents a moving of the goalposts in regard to the traditional academic freewill debate. The dilemma evaporates. We come right back to the Oracle at Delphi and the idea that in order to answer your question it would be necessary to ‘Know thyself’. I hope you find this interesting if not convincing.

Peter Jones received the ISFP Fellowship for his dissertation ‘From Metaphysics to Mysticism: Exploring the Case for a Neutral Metaphysical Position’

Esther asked:

Hi, I know this question may be a little personal, But I am a philosophy major at university, and I have a passion for the subject. Unlike most undergraduate majors, I do not simply study it because I need a degree, but I actually take it to heart and live by it. I am a Kantian ethicist and try to live my life by Kant’s imperatives. The thing I am wondering is, when I try to date people and tell them this they get scared and ‘weirded out’. Why are people so scared of dating a philosopher? Why does philosophy scare people when Religion does not? They are both contain the same basic elements: a ethical theory, system of values, and a basic treatise yet one scares potential dates off and the other does not. Why is this so?

Answer by Stuart Burns

I don’t know that this is the only answer, but it the answer that I have come up with over the almost 50 years I have been a self-described philosopher.

It takes a very special attitude towards life to be a self-described philosopher. It takes a special kind of generalist approach to understanding questions. And it requires a very sceptical attitude towards edicts handed down by authority, any authority. Very few people have that attitude or can adopt that approach. So as philosophers, we tend to view all sorts of questions and issues in a way that confuses most people.

The vast majority of people do not think in generalist terms, and never question their values or their ethical assumptions. This vast majority prefers to let other people instruct them in this regard. Which is why religion is so prevalent. Religion provides ready answers to generalized questions, and simple edicts instead of moral theory. (Super-market tabloids serve a similar purpose.) Asking people to think like a philosopher scares them, because they do not know how. (Schools do not teach people to think for themselves – good heavens, can you imagine the chaos if the students began to question the lessons provided by their teachers!!) Most people would not know what to do with an ethical theory or a basic treatise. They are much happier with simple to follow edicts, and a simple list of values. ‘Thou shalt not kill!’ or ‘Life is Sacred!’. No if ands or buts, no requirement for thinking, no requirement for dealing with consequences.

Since most people accept their handed-down moral system without question, it makes them uncomfortable in the presence of someone who announces to all and sundry that they do so question such things. Someone who has learned to think in this generalized way, to examine their values and ethical premises, and to question the authority behind the edicts that society proclaims is a very scary person to most people.

So over the years, I have learned to keep my mouth shut with regards to my interest in Philosophy. Except for some very rare occasions, or with some very rare friends, I do no more than mention my interest in philosophy, and then only if asked. If you have not already discovered this, I think you will find that you cannot have a philosophical discussion with most people – no matter how intelligent they are; no matter what the topic might be.

So I don’t think that it is the oddity (to me, at least, not being a fan of Kant) of your Kantian ethics that is the problem, it is the uniqueness of your outlook on the questions of daily life that threatens.

http://www3.sympatico.ca/saburns/pg00cv.htm

Michelle asked:

Discuss Hume’s response to Glaucon’s challenge

Answer by Craig Skinner

In brief:

Glaucon’s challenge is ‘Why should I be moral, if I can be immoral when it suits me, and can get away with it without loss of reputation?’

Hume has no better answer than Socrates does.

To enlarge:

In book two of Plato’s Republic, telling the story of Gyges who finds an invisibility ring and, using its powers, kills the king, marries the queen and takes all the riches of the kingdom, Glaucon asks Socrates which of us would act differently if we had this kind of power. He challenges Socrates to prove that it is always better to be moral (‘just’), rather than to be immoral even if the latter goes undetected and brings great benefit. Socrates spends the rest of the Republic trying to do this. He claims that immorality always brings psychological damage, and even claims that a moral person who is reviled, rejected, and unjustly regarded as immoral is still happier than an undetected immoral person who is rich and well-respected. Readers of Republic find Glaucon’s question more compelling than Socrates’ answer, and moral philosophers have struggled ever since to better it and to come up with a good argument that will convince an egoist to be moral.

Hume’s response notes the problem, endorses Socrates’ view that immorality damages a person’s integrity and peace of mind, makes the point that in practice immorality risks loss of reputation and future trust, but confesses to no good answer to the determined, careful egoist.

Thus, he says (An Enquiry Concerning the Principals of Morals, Sect. 9, 22-25).

‘…a sensible knave….may think that an act of iniquity….will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union…. That honesty is the best policy, may be a good general rule, but is liable to many exceptions: and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions. I must confess that, if a man think that this reasoning much requires an answer, it would be a little difficult to find any which will to him appear satisfactory and convincing.’

and

‘Inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity… these are very requisite to happiness… knaves… have sacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character for the acquisition of worthless toys…’.

We are not asking why people in general should be moral. As Hobbes said, life in a society with no morality would be solitary, poor, nasty brutish and short. No, the immoral person wants to live in a generally moral society but to take advantage of it in her own self-interest. We are asking why an individual should herself be moral.

Suggested justifications are:

1. God commands it.
2. Makes for fulfilling life.
3. Irrational to do otherwise.

1. God commands it.

Even assuming there are any gods, obeying them for fear of punishment or hope of reward smacks of self-interest. No, just as a (good) god would command the rules because they are good, so we should follow them for this reason. But the egoist disagrees and we are no further on.

2. Makes for fulfilling life.

This is Socrates’ view, later Aristotle’s, Hume’s and modern virtue ethicists’. Virtue is necessary for eudaimonia (flourishing) according to our nature as rational, social, child-rearing mammals. I have sympathy with this view, that the ruthless, wealthy mobster is ignorant of what

constitutes real happiness. But I accept that the sensible knave can simply say it’s crazy to deny Gyges had a good life: he married a queen and ruled a kingdom, what more do you want?

3. Acting immorally is irrational.

This is one strand in the eudaimonic argument (2. above). But is famously the Kantian view, that the moral law is what we legislate for ourselves as rational autonomous beings, so that, being rational agents, we follow it, and to do otherwise is irrational. But again, the egoist can simply

say that she formulates maxims for her own interests and rationally follows them.

For completeness, more recent attempts by Nagel, Parfit and Alison Hills to cast doubt on the rationality or coherence of the egoist position, are, in my view, unconvincing.

In conclusion there is no knockdown argument that can convince a determined egoistic, immoral, ‘sensible knave’ to be moral, no Holy Grail of moral philosophy as it has been termed. But here we are no worse off than we are trying to convince the determined sceptic that the external world exists. I think, with Aristotle and the virtue ethicists, that we have reason to be moral: it is the best way to a fulfilled life, although luck, both good and bad, also plays a big part.

Craig Skinner at PhiloSophos.com

Adam asked:

Who checks physical ‘laws’ and claims in science?

Because despite my desperate attempts to explain them away, my experiments have seem to not just altered, but blown current electrical Lenz Law and electromagnetic theory, and also energy theory out of the water.

Answer by Craig Skinner

The answer is: the scientific community at large.

One of the strengths of science is its robust system of peer review, public discussion, criticism, and repeated testing of ideas against the world. In this way, bad ideas get weeded out, however eminent their advocate, and good ones get accepted even if at first they seem crazy. It may take time, and there may be no agreed view for a long period. Also ideas are sometimes accepted because they work, even though the overall theory has problematic features which, it is hoped, will be sorted out by later work.

A couple of examples to illustrate.

Wegener’s theory of continental drift languished for years – how could any sane person believe the Earth’s land masses were shifting all the time ? But eventually the evidence built up and now it is one of the really secure theories, highly unlikely ever to be thought incorrect.

Newton’s theory of Universal Gravitation was accepted because of its power to predict movement of planets, moons, comets and cannon balls, even though it incorporated a mysterious force acting at a distance through millions of miles of empty space – how could the moon, say, know that the Earth was there, would it still go round in a circle if the Earth were suddenly removed, complained those who supported Descartes’ rival vortex theory. And Newton agreed, saying he merely described what happened mathematically but ‘framed no hypothesis’ as to the real nature of gravity. And it remained a mystery till Einstein concluded that there is no such force, things just move freely in curved space (but whether curved space is less mysterious than action-at-a-distance seems debatable). Although Einstein’s theory has passed every test made of it, it is incompatible with quantum mechanics, another fantastically successful theory, so eventually one or both of these theories will have to be amended to give a good theory of quantum gravity. String theory and loop quantum gravity are on the table, but their claims are speculative, so far untestable, and hence not generally accepted. And so science gradually advances our understanding.

As regards your own claims and experiments, the way forward is clear. Select an appropriate Physics Journal (list on Wikipedia), consult its advice as to preferred style, write up your work and submit it. If it’s considered nonsense, or not nonsense but flawed, or ideas already known, or new but unimportant, you’ll be told right away. If considered more than this, it will be sent to a couple of referees for comment, and thereafter may be accepted, accepted with amendments, or rejected – you will generally be shown referees’ comments. It’s hard work and often disappointing, but this system of public scrutiny and criticism by the scientific community is a good one despite human frailty and prejudice, and occasional research fraud.

Craig Skinner at PhiloSophos.com

Christopher asked:

Do you think a piece of art is more meaningful to the artist, or the person experiencing the artwork, most often? I’m specifically thinking about music. A musician can write a song that just expresses some idea and has no personal meaning to the artist, but a person can then listen to the song and relate to it in such a way that it becomes personally meaningful to him/her. I think this happens a lot, but I think a lot of the time an artists true meaning is lost or not communicated to the listener/ viewer. Also, having an ‘aesthetic experience’ which I’ve seen some philosophers write about may or may not occur for the artist.

Answer by Jürgen Lawrenz

Let’s start from the end of your question. You say you’ve seen some philosophers writing about aesthetic experiences, and I wonder why you didn’t ask them your question while you were watching them?

It could have been valuable for you, because as they were writing, they might have told you that thinking and writing is a different experience from reading another writer’s book. And your question would never have been born, because you would have realised that writing a song is not having an aesthetic experience, because the song doesn’t yet exist.

But you are entirely correct that the audience of a song, or play, or painting, or symphony will find it a meaningful experience, whether in the positive or negative sense. Whereas the composer, painter or poet may (at least sometimes) be quite indifferent and regard it as a piece of hackwork, done merely for the pay.

And so we arrive at the beginning of your question. Art is quite plainly of greater interest to an audience than to an artist, because there are many audience-people and very few artists. So you’ve already nailed it down from the quantity angle.

The other angle is that artists are rarely objective judges of the value of their own work. Some overestimate their own talent; some are very casual about it; others might pursue an obsession for their whole life and sacrifice health and happiness for it. But this is usually quite irrelevant. In the end, the people who pay to watch or hear are the ones who make the final decision. This is because art is not something artists dreamed up for their own pleasure, but the people and communities who have a need for this kind of entertainment, edification, ritual or commemoration. So the need comes first, the artist later. Necessarily the thing he or she makes must be needed and to meet that need. And artists who supply that need well, and often, might finish up as ‘the greats of our culture’ and sometimes even as millionaires.

Jürgen Lawrenz at PhiloSophos.com

Zizipho asked:

Is determinism true or false? Do we have free will or not?

Justify your answer and defend it against some possible objections.

Beverly asked:

From a philosophical point of view do you think human is determined or free?

Answer by Martin Jenkins

As I recall, the Dilemma of Determinism was espoused by William James. It goes along the lines that if determinism is true – an effect is the necessary consequence of a prior cause – we do not possess free will. If determinism is false, then indeterminism follows. Indeterminism rules out free will as there is a nebulousness of events which occur in the absence of cause and effect.

Compatibilism

One objection to the dilemma could be to deny James’ implicit assumption in the first horn of the dilemma that cause and effect are deterministic leading to the conclusion that either determinism is true or it is false.

If we retain cause and effect (and as David Hume demonstrated, these could be nothing more than a cultural custom, an anthropomorphic assumption and not objectively real) then a position not of determinism but of compatibilism is reached. Namely, there may a willing of a cause which leads to an effect or consequence. The relation between will and effect is not necessary in the sense that effect had to and could not, not have occurred; the person could have willed otherwise. Hence free will is compatible with causality. It has to be or the position of indeterminism ensues.

However, at the moment a ‘choice’ is made, the factors for that choice (if indeed we are consciously aware of them) might have varying degrees of compulsion. For example, I can freely choose to answer or not answer this question. Yet as someone interested in philosophy and its problems, as a panel member of ‘Ask a Philosopher’, that I haven’t answered a question for some time perhaps suggests there was a higher degree of probability that I would have answered this question. This highlights the larger relation between freedom of will and probability.

Of course, an immediate objection is that probability is only probable, it is not deterministic. As not deterministic, free will still obtains and the person does make a choice. However, it is unlikely/improbable that being interested in philosophy etc, I would not be answering questions for ‘Ask a Philosopher’.

Yet again it will be retorted ‘You can still choose not to’, nothing stops you from doing otherwise for you possess free will’. The person can quite easily reflect upon his/her intentions, actions and in so doing become aware of alternatives and, aware of the possibility of willing them or not. Compatibilism is compatible with free will. Determinism is a survival from a Theological weltanshauung where Gods foreknowledge of what choices his creations believe they make, determines how they act and behave.

Martin Jenkins received the ISFP Fellowship for his dissertation ‘Aristocratic Radicalism or Anarchy? An Examination of Nietzsche’s Doctrine of Will to Power’. He is a Pathways Mentor.

Answer by Stuart Burns

The idea of the human will being ‘determined’ comes from the physical sciences. In the physical sciences, every physical event has a physical cause. Since our doing anything is a physical event, then it must have a physical cause. What happens must be determined by the cause. Given the cause, then the effect is inevitable. Hence the notion that our choices are ‘determined’.

‘Free Will’ on the other hand, is an idea that comes from the Humanities. If we do not have free will, we are not free to choose our path in life. If we do not have free will, we could not have chosen other than we did choose. If our choices are not freely taken, then we cannot be held responsible for the choices we have made. The notion of being morally responsible for our choices (and their consequences) demands that those choices are within our control, and that we could have chosen otherwise.

These two ideas might seem to be at odds with each other. The notion of determinism seems to be claiming that our choices and actions are the result of some cause. The notion of free will, on the other hand, seems to be claiming that if our choices are not our own, then we are not responsible for the consequences.

But what would constitute our will being ‘free’? What would really make our choices our ‘own’ choices? What does it really mean to say that you could have chosen otherwise?

If you are free enough that you could have chosen otherwise, it still has to be *your* choice. It cannot be someone else’s choice. Nor can it be the result of random processes in your mind/brain, or the result of your consciously choosing to flip a coin (or some such). If your choice is not *yours*, then it is not an expression of your free will.

So what is it for a choice to be unequivocally *yours*? Does it not have to stem from your character, personality, experience, goals, desires, values, knowledge, beliefs, and the reasons and justifications you perceived at the time? How could it possibly be otherwise? But this is what *you* are. And given who you are and what you are made of, in any particular circumstance the only way that you could choose other than how you do choose, is if something external to *you* forced the issue. In many cases, your friends can predict the way that you will choose, because they know who you are. And if you were to choose other than you would normally choose, your friends would look for some unusual reason for this unusual choice.

But all that is no more than saying that you are the product of your past history. Which is all that Determinism is saying. The only difference is that this second description is couched in language from the Intentional Stance. Whereas the first description is couched in language from the Physical Stance.

Determinism is not incompatible with Free Will. The two notions only seem to conflict because they are talking about the same situation from two different perspectives. Determinism speaks of the event of your choice being caused by some physical factors in your past. Free Will speaks of the event of your choice being caused by the moral, esthetic, or valuational attitudes you have learned. Same event, same cause, different descriptions.

http://www3.sympatico.ca/saburns/pg00cv.htm