Gabrielle asked:

A recent investigation into universities in Northville reveals that the percentage of philosophy prefessors who are female was 11.2486102% in 2012, 10.9399783% in 2013 and 10.6400161% in 2014. This is very alarming because it tells us that in only 37 years , 6 months and 15 days, female philosophy professors will constitute less than 0.33333333% of Northville teaching force. Identify two main problems.

The CIA World Factbook is one of the most reliable sources for worldwide statistics. According to it only 99% of germans are literate — with a population of 80.716 million people, this means a straggeering 807,160 germans cant read! But working from the same source , we see that only 351,100 canadians have trouble reading, clearly Canada’s education system is superiror at teaching is citizens to read? Is there a problem with this question?

Answer by David Robjant

The abuse of statistics is a political art-form practiced by Governments and campaigners alike. It is all the more effective for the general ignorance of the population. It is possibly a worthwhile research project to find out whether we philosophers are also among the ignorant. You might suspect so, because philosophy isn’t primarily about numbers, but on the other hand the abuse of statistics is mainly about the careful handling of definitions and deductions, which is right up our street.

1. The Canada v. Germany question is pretty easy, once you realise that the total population of Canada is less than half that of Germany. It’s not at all surprising, therefore, that Canada has less than half the number of illiterate adults. Nothing here suggests that Canada’s ‘education system is superior at teaching it’s citizens to read’.

There are more complex kinds of statistical swindle. Like:

2. Pretending that a conclusion or hypothesis is proved by the data, when it is merely consistent with it. Firstly, you can’t deduce anything about gender representation in 10 years time from three years of data. If 2010 and 2011 are lower figures, the 2012 figure could be purely anomalous and no evidence of a trend. Secondly, you need to know how many universities and university professors there are in Northville, before you could work out what would be statistically significant here. In connection with that, you need to work out if there are temporary factors. If the sample size is small enough, the retirement of one staff member could be enough to suggest a trend in a three year run of figures.

It’s not really the case that there are lies, damned lies, and statistics. Typically the statistics are correct, but the problem is that it’s too easy to fool the ignorant by pretending that statistics imply something that they don’t.

David Robjant at philosophos.org

Beth asked:

I can’t think of any philosophical questions. Is there something wrong with me?

Answer by Shaun Williamson

There may be many things wrong with you but since I don’t know you I can’t say what they are.

If you want to know about some philosophical questions then read a book about philosophical questions. Try Bertrand Russells History of Western Philosophy.

Shaun Williamson developed the Ask a Philosopher cgi script question.pl. He did his postgraduate studies on the philosophy of Wittgenstein.

Answer by Geoffrey Klempner

In Bertrand Russell by A.J. Ayer (1972) there is the following interesting comment about the divergence in the views of Russell and Wittgenstein after the publication of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:

"Wittgenstein coupled Russell with H.G. Wells as men who had run out of problems, and Russell, though he retained great affection for Wittgenstein, could see little merit in his later work." (p.16)

Obviously, if you have never been gripped by a philosophical question, you are missing out on something. As a philosopher, I would have to say that, wouldn’t I? But what does it mean to ‘run out of problems’? Is it possible that your thinking could take you to a place — as Wittgenstein thought it had done with Russell — that you were no longer able to believe that there are any philosophical questions to answer?

This is an occupational hazard for philosophers who search for, and think they have found, the Big Theory. Russell’s ‘Big Theory’ was logical atomism. The theory furnished him with an epistemology, a metaphysics, a complete methodology for philosophical analysis, in short, a way of breaking down and resolving any philosophical problem. Ergo, there were no real problems left.

This view is ironic, given that Russell, more than most philosophers who had attained his level of prominence, was not afraid of changing his mind about answers he had previously given. (He makes a remark about this somewhere.) True, he didn’t see what the later Wittgenstein was getting at in his ‘philosophical therapy’ but this is a common issue with philosophers. ‘You do not appreciate the problems I am working on’ does not equate to ‘You have lost the ability to appreciate philosophical problems.’

This is of special interest to me because, like Russell, I have, or had, a ‘Big Theory’. The difference is that while logical atomism had an answer to practically everything, my theory of subjective and objective worlds merely redescribes the problems of philosophy, leaving things largely as they were before — apart from ‘one big thing’ which is all I really know. In terms of Isaiah Berlin’s classification, I am a hedgehog rather than a fox.

I see lots of philosophical questions. I fear that some of these questions, those which are the most fundamental, have no answer even in principle. They are conundrums. Wouldn’t it be better if one could just let these go? What is the point of continuing to ponder questions which have no answer? The only reply I can give to that question is simply that this is what I have to do.

http://www.philosophypathways.com/vita.html

Anoop asked:

What does Descartes mean by saying that ‘human mind is better known than the body’? How does Gilbert Ryle challenge Descartes’ mind body dualism?

Answer by Danny Krämer

Descartes’ aim was to find a foundation for the new emerging sciences. He wanted truths that are so certain that they can guarantee the truth of the superstructure of science. Therefore, Descartes used his method of general doubt. He questioned everything he ever believed in his life.

First he questions sense experience. Our senses can mislead us. There are illusions and therefore it is conceivable that everything we know by sense experience is just wrong. Just think about ‘Matrix’. The humans who live in the matrix think that they know a lot of things by sense experience. But in fact, they know nothing like ‘there is a cup of tea’. Everything is just an illusion. Descartes goes even further. Also our knowledge of mathematics and geometry — so to speak a priori knowledge — could be wrong. Maybe the matrix just lets us think that ‘2 + 2 = 4′ is a true proposition. Of course for Descartes an evil demon plays the role of the matrix. So if everything is an illusion — matter, mathematics, geometry, sense experience — then everything you know of your body could be wrong. In the matrix I could have blonde hair even though in reality I have brown hair and so on.

Then there is Descartes’ famous phrase ‘cogito ergo sum’ — I think, therefore I am. That is Descartes’ answer to the question what the foundation of all our knowledge is. Even though I doubt everything, I cannot doubt that I think.

Gilbert Ryle now writes in The Concept of Mind that Descartes was misled by the ‘ghost in the machine’ myth. Ryle uses the concept of a ‘category mistake’ for his critique. Take this famous example of a category mistake: A foreign student comes to Oxford and asks where the university is. You show him the class rooms and the library and all the stuff. Then he asks you ‘But where is the university?’ He just uses the category of a university like a category of a room.

For Ryle, Descartes makes the same mistake. He uses mental vocabulary as if it is the polar opposite of ‘body-talk’. Therefore, he buys in every problem that ever emerged out of dualism. (The question of the interaction of the substances etc.) Ryle suggests, that what we call the mind are dispositions of the our body. He is therefore a behaviorist. Sugar has the disposition to dissolve if you put it into water. Your body has dispositions to intelligent behaviour in certain circumstances. There is no mental ghost that steers the body. The mind are just the intelligent dispositions of your body.

Danny Krämer has a Philosophy MA from the university of Erfurt. His blog ‘The Realist Turn’ can be found at http://therealistturn.wordpress.com.

Stevie asked:

What does Leibniz mean by a ‘world’? What does compossibility mean? How does an adequate view of compossibility help Leibniz respond to Spinoza’s necessitarianism?

Answer by Jürgen Lawrenz

Compossibility denotes that certain things or processes in the universe can or could occur simultaneously. Hence the opposite, incompossibility denotes that, although all some of these things and processes could logically exist side by side, their actual existence may be impeded by the effect which their actions may have on each other. E.g. fire and water can co-exist, but in their interaction one destroys the other. But there will be some things and processes which deny co-existence to other things and processes absolutely. E.g. the universe cannot be rigid and fluid at the same time, though perhaps at different times.

So Leibniz’s understanding of the world is the present actual composition of the universe. It doesn’t mean much to us, as we can’t know the total composition of the universe, but God would know. Where this train of thought is useful, however, is in cosmology and metaphysics, where it can happen that some things and processes are logically possible at any time, but the concept of compossibility overrides logic if some of the compossibles cannot co-exist in actuality.

Accordingly, all phenomena are ruled by contingency. Compossibility implies inter alia that the actual existence of X is contingent on being compossible with Y. It is also contingent on prior conditions P that must have been compossible with Q in order to facilitate the existence of X. And so on.

Apply the full weight of this aspect of actuality and you will see that it rules out necessitarianism. In fact, it is one of Leibniz’ principles (so-called ‘minimax’) that the contingency built into the universe by God renders necessitarianism superfluous. To achieve the greatest conceivable variety by the smallest expenditure of means is tantamount to devastating necessitarianism, which requires infinite foresight and control and is therefore ‘labour intensive’ to a degree that (in Leibniz’ sight) would be demeaning to God.

Consider for comparison that you might write a mathematical formula which hides under its curt symbolism a long rat’s tail separate and very laborious subroutines, each of which may change the result of the symbolism by the insertion of specific integers. Leibniz therefore attributes the same skills of abridging huge cosmic events in a single equation, whose details He does not have to know as the equation will constrain any solution to its preset limits.

Finally, contingency ensures continuing creativity, not only by God, but by his creatures as well. In this respect, Leibniz makes the interesting observation that such an enormous clutter of detail as hard determinism requires, is completely unnecessary in a universe driven by contingency, which needs only the provision of boundaries at a preset minimum and maximum.

Jürgen Lawrenz at philosophos.org

Bhupendra asked:

What is Buddhist epistemology, ontology, metaphysics and axiology?

With regards,
Bhupendra

Answer by Peter Jones

Hi Bhupendra,

You are expecting a lot if you want a quick way to understand the epistemology, ontology and ethics of Buddhism. What may be helpful to you is that all three would reduce to one in the end. That is, the axiology is explained by the epistemology which is explained by the ontology. Or you could start at the other end.

This is the internet age and there is plenty to read on these topics. It frightens me that a student at a Nepalese university would ask this on a public forum. Do you not have some experts around and a good library? Here are some thoughts in case not.

The world would reduce to or simply is a unity, such that all sentient beings would share an identity. When Schopenhauer explains altruism as the ‘breakthrough of a metaphysical truth’ this is what he is getting at, that while the truth of identity is for us often just an intuition, even so this would often be enough for it to have an impact on our behaviour. It was familiarity with what he calls his ‘better consciousness’ that allowed him to give this account of altruism. Buddhist practice would entail verifying this identity fully in experience. If it is unverified, not real for us, then our behaviour is guided by ignorance, while if it verified then it is informed by knowledge. Thus ethics would be solved by knowledge and ethical confusion caused by ignorance. ‘Sin’ would be ignorance such that, as Jesus says somewhere in the non-canonical gospels, ‘Sin, as such, does not exist’. Thus Buddhism has what Franco Varela call an ’embodied’ ethics and not a rule book. Erwin Schrödinger puts it like this.

“When you know by direct intuitive evidence either (a) that you are one with every sentient being or (b) that nothing substantial makes you distinct from the other sentient beings, being good with others is a matter of course.”

Schrödinger is always neat and tidy with his words and doesn’t waste many, so he may be worth reading. You can see that a knowledge of ontology would be the key to ethics. Likewise epistemology, the question of what we know and how, would be solved by ontology. By realising the ontological structure of the world we would, equivalently, realise the nature of knowledge and its source. If we go in search of a solution for epistemology then we will end up with ontology and ethics. They stand or fall together and must be understood together as three aspects of one knowledge or three derivatives of one fact.

I hope this vaguely helps. For ontology I would recommend Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way. With work the ethics and epistemology can be derived from this. As for understanding it, this could be a life-time’s work, some would say more, and it would depend on practice as well as intellectual study. But getting the general idea is not so hard. On the ‘advaita’ view this would be the same axiology, epistemology and ontology as that of the Upanishads.

Good luck with a difficult topic.

Peter Jones at philosophos.org

Valerie asked:

Hello. In groups of four, we have to teach 15 minutes about a philosophical topic. We got terms which we have to explain to the other students. My topic is ‘the Slippery Slope principle’. I cant find much comprehensible information in the internet etc. So I’d like to ask you. Id would be very nice, if you could give me some simple explanation. Maybe you also know, how I could teach it to my colleagues in form of game, video or maybe music. Thank you for your answer, I’m very happy and I’m sure, that I would get some good help!

Answer by Craig Skinner

You ask for a simple explanation.

Here it is with two examples to illustrate.

A ‘slippery slope’, literally, is a sloping surface on which it is difficult to gain a foothold so that one slides downhill on it. Such as an icy hillside.

The ‘Slippery Slope Principle’ uses the term metaphorically, saying that if a certain course of action is allowed, it is the first step on a slippery slope, and further, less desirable actions will then be allowed, and then yet more, even less desirable, ultimately leading to totally unacceptable actions.

So, the argument goes, we should not take the first step.

An example is legalizing assisted suicide. Many people are against this on the slippery slope principle. They say the next step could be pressurizing old people, who need expensive medical and social care, to agree to assisted suicide. Then local Euthanasia Centres which routinely terminate old or disabled people. Finally organized death camps such as the Nazis set up.

Of course, the argument may be used to try to stop a progressive slide which many people see as an improvement. For example, in my lifetime, homosexual activity was a crime, and many people said that allowing it would be the first step on the slippery slope: next, people would be openly gay; then same-sex marriages would occur; then gay couples would be allowed to bring up children; then some Churches would say it wasn’t wrong; finally the Pope would give it his blessing. The argument was sound, all of this has happened, except for the Pope’s blessing.

You can think of other examples for yourself.

Craig Skinner at philosophos.org