Dana asked:

Is the nature of fundamentally understanding reality intrinsically illogical, and would this subsequently imply that reality itself is fundamentally illogical (since reality is defined by perception/ understanding)?

Also, this would lead to many consequences, such as the inability for science, or logic, to ever refute God, since logic itself breaks down at the essence of existence, and therefore the rules by which we govern any means of defining what explanations may or may not be sensible.

Answer by Julian Plumley

Your initial question is: ‘Is the nature of fundamentally understanding reality intrinsically illogical?’ There are a couple of problems with this: I am not sure what the nature of an understanding might be; ‘illogical’ has to be made more precise; ‘fundamentally’ does not really add anything except emphasis. So I think the question needs to be slightly modified as follows: ‘Is the notion of understanding reality self-contradictory?’

Your second question is: ‘Would [the notion of understanding reality being self-contradictory] subsequently imply that reality itself is fundamentally illogical (since reality is defined by perception/ understanding)?’ This question is already an abbreviated argument, which might be expanded as follows.

1. The notion of understanding reality is self-contradictory.

2. Reality is defined by perception and understanding.

3. Therefore, reality is self-contradictory.

Is the argument valid? No. Whose perception and understanding is this talking about, and of what? Presumably, mankind’s perception and understanding of reality. There is also an ambiguity between the use of ‘reality’ in 1 and in 2. In 1, I think ‘reality’ refers to everything, the whole world, so let’s say ‘Reality’ (capitalised). In 2, ‘reality’ means ‘the reality of a thing’ or it’s individual nature. There is also a hidden step getting from 2 to 3. So we can repair the argument as follows.

1′. The notion of mankind’s understanding Reality is self-contradictory.

2′. The reality of a thing is defined by mankind’s [perception and] understanding of that thing.

3′. If the reality of a thing is defined by something self-contradictory, then that thing is self-contradictory.

Therefore 4. Reality is self-contradictory.

The argument is now sound if the premises are true, but are they? For 3′, if the nature (reality) of X is defined by Y, and Y is self-contradictory, does that make X self-contradictory? Arguably, yes. If we define the nature of the red Queen’s favourite rose garden arrangements as round squares, then those arrangements are themselves self-contradictory. For 1′ – this is argued for later. For 2′ – this is a highly controversial, irrealist viewpoint. It says, with Protagoras, that ‘Man is the measure of all things’. I will not take this point further, since there is ample literature on that subject.

So 1′ is the key to both of your questions. Is understanding Reality logically impossible? You offer an argument in its defence as follows.

5. A fundamental explanation for reality must explain itself (i.e. be a self-contained explanation).

6. So it [a fundamental explanation for reality] would be unsubstantiated by external means, and without any external evidence supporting it.

7. So there is no means to prove it [infer it] from anything else.

8. Anything that cannot be proved is illogical.

Therefore 9. It is illogical.

In this argument, you have shifted your ground from ‘understanding’ to ‘explanation’. But these are different notions. An explanation goes from an explanans to an explanandum, and these have to be two different propositions, or the explanation in not satisfactory. But ‘understanding’ is not the same – not everything we understand stands in need of explanation. And understanding is not always propositional: e.g. understanding what the colour red is like is knowledge-by-acquaintance, not ‘knowledge-that’. The argument also has some hidden steps and has to be repaired as follows.

10. If the explanation of something is self-contradictory, then the notion of understanding that thing is self-contradictory. [i.e. Something can only be understood if it can be explained.]

5′. Any explanation of Reality [by mankind] is included in Reality.

Therefore 6′. There is no explanans of Reality that is independent of Reality.

11. All valid explanation proceeds via logical inference from an explanans that is independent of the explanandum to the explanandum.

Therefore 7′. There is no valid explanation of Reality.

8′. Any non-valid explanation is self-contradictory.

Therefore 9b’. Any explanation of Reality is self-contradictory.

Therefore 1′. The notion of mankind’s understanding Reality is self-contradictory.

So how about the premises of this argument? As I stated above, I do not think 10 is true. Explanation and understanding are not connected in this way. 5′ seems true, since we are part of Reality. 11 is not true, since there are perfectly good inductive explanations. But the requirement for logical inference is superfluous. The core idea of your argument is that the explanation is internal, not that it is non-inferential. 8′ is not true, but this might be improved by translating your ‘illogical’ as ‘self-contradictory or meaningless.’

Overall, this argument for 1′ is going not going to work in this way. But your underlying problem is that you cannot see a way we can ever reach a final understanding of Reality, if we are embedded in Reality. So you ask: ‘How could an ultimate theory or understanding of reality and everything possibly retain any sense of reason without continuing forever…?’

To me, it looks like you are using a foundationalist theory of knowledge: we can only know things that we can logically infer from other things that we know. (And we can understand what we know.) But this cannot get us very far. There is very little about the world that we infer logically, as against inductively. And there is not enough self-evident knowledge to start from to build up foundationalist knowledge.

Mankind’s major project for understanding Reality is Science. (And you could add Theology, too, if you like.) Science uses mainly a coherence theory of knowledge. The main criterion is that the findings of science do not contradict one-another, or the observations. Logical inference is used to test this (see Popper) but science is not built up from some self-evident foundation. The whole thing could shift radically if a single law was shown to be false. (And this nearly happened recently with the putative discovery of faster-than-light neutrinos.) So in this way, the project of science cannot ever finish, it will always remain tentative. But this does not make it self-contradictory, nor does it refute logic.

Victoria asked:

How would Plato define ‘Eros’ in a couple sentences?

Answer by Jürgen Lawrenz

‘Eros’ is the word for desire.

In Plato’s use, you will find many different kinds of eros, because we have many desires.

There is an eros for knowledge, for poetry, for travel, for science and so on. And, of course, for sex.

in the modern world, we only associate sex with eros, as in ‘erotic’.

But you can see from the examples I have given that there is another word which we use in replacement.

This is ‘passion’.

There is a passion for knowledge, for travel etc.

So Platonic ‘eros’ = modern ‘passion’.

Naveed asked:

What kind of truth is Machiavelli concerned with?

Answer by Caterina Pangallo

Machiavelli’s truth is human truth. This means he was not fooled by what people wrote or spoke. He looked at them in action. When you do this intently, you soon discover their words and their behaviour are very different. But the truth is only discovered by watching them acting. Then they reveal themselves in their truth.

A good example are the so-called Princes Manuals that were some of the favourite literature of the time. They are full of noble and idealistic sentiments, and the princes read them, because it is good for conversations at the table. But when it comes to acting, things change. Princes want power. If there is a rival, they get rid of him, even if it means murder. So this is the truth about princes.

Therefore Machiavelli’s truth was the truth of power. He writes: ‘Where it is an absolute question of the welfare of our country, we must admit of no consideration of justice or injustice, of mercy or cruelty, of praise or ignominy; but putting all else aside we must adopt whatever course will save the nation’s existence and liberty.’

Morality in general is a code of conduct given to the members of a society or state to maintain collective order, unity and strength. There is no ‘natural law’, no ‘right’ universally agreed upon. Politics in the sense of statesmanship, must be held completely independent of morality.

At the beginning of The Prince he writes:

‘Since my intention is to say something of practical use to the enquirer, I have thought it proper to represent things as they are in real truth, rather than as they are imagined.’

So there you have it. That’s his truth.

Real, efficient and ruthless politics is completely independent of morality. In fact, the more people talk about morality, the more they show in their conduct how much they despise it. And therefore the truth of politics is the truth of power — again.

Machiavelli’s writings were very much disliked. But this was only because he told us the truth about the exercise of political power.

Basically you could say that his idea of truth has nothing in common with ethical or religious ideas of truth. Even for those who preach ethics, morals and religion, if they want to win, they must come down to the political truth.

Elizabeth asked:

Is God necessary for objective morality? Is He sufficient?

Answer by Julian Plumley

I can see three places we could look for ‘objective morality’. We could give it to ourselves, we could derive it from nature, or we could get it from God.

The problem with giving morality to ourselves is that it is hard to see how it could be objective. There are some admirable moral schemes that have been drawn up by people, without reference to God. There is much in Marcus Aurelius’ or Confucius’ morality that most of us would sign up for. But how can I decide between them? How can I say they are better than Nazi morality without referring to some prior standard – but whose should that be? If morality is given by (a) man, then we will be moral relativists.

To escape this, many have tried to naturalise morality. The laws of physics are the paradigm case; they are objective. While we sometimes argue about what they are, we all agree they must apply to all of us (all the time and everywhere), and there are agreed procedures for testing what they are.

But if we look at nature, we do not find the moral law. We find the law of the jungle – natural selection – perhaps the opposite of morality. A more sophisticated view might explain morality as a product of a social evolution: societies with a moral law survive better than those without. Now it’s not clear to me whether this is in fact true. But the greater problem is that physical law is obligatory while moral law is voluntary. This means you cannot extract a society’s moral laws from observing its behaviour (because we don’t all behave morally). So morality is not objective. A moral society behaving in a Machiavellian way will get the same results as an amoral society behaving in a Machiavellian way.

When we look to God for objective morality, we are subject to some obvious criticisms: ‘Who gave God morality?’ and ‘Why trust that God has it right?’ Even if we concede that God is a lot wiser than we are, these questions don’t really go away. But I think this way of looking at the situation is incomplete.

Morality is not (only) a list of rules handed to us. It is a prescription for how we should live in order to be happy and to fulfill our purpose. If you buy a Toyota and look at the owner’s manual, you do not ask: ‘Who gave Toyota authority to tell me how to run my car?’ Of course they have authority, they designed it. In a similar way, God designed us and knows what is best for us. If true, this is an objective fact.

So my answer is…

Necessary: Yes. I can see how God is required for objective morality and I cannot see how the alternatives can make morality objective.

Sufficient: No. If you think that God is the source of objective morality, you are committed to quite a lot more than the existence of God. In particular, you have to recognise that you are a creature – something created by God – and He is not. That puts Him into a special relationship of authority over you and helps justify His moral law.

p.s. The car analogy is from C.S. Lewis and a some of my other points were also originally made by him.

www.sumrescogitans.org

Elon asked:

Is lying always wrong?

Answer by Craig Skinner

Few philosophers have held the view that lying is always wrong.

Plato famously commended the ‘noble lie’, a foundation myth told to the populace in his ideal republic to foster order and bolster the rulers’ position. To be fair, Plato felt it best if everybody, including the rulers, believed it, but, failing that, it would suffice if the others believed it. The myth was that all humans shared a bond, being born from the earth (this seems fair enough), but those born to rule had nobler metals in their souls implanted by the gods (gold for rulers, silver for auxiliaries, iron/bronze for artisans and farmers). This incurs the wrath of modern supporters of liberal-democratic, open societies, notably Popper, as being totalitarian or fascist. In addition, mating arrangements would be billed as random, so that any citizen felt she might become the parent of a ruler, but in reality rulers would emerge from deliberately matching the most talented. Lies, yes. Noble, I dont think so.

Of course in practice governments do lie to the people in the ‘national interest’. For example in wartime, the extent of casualties and setbacks was standardly kept secret lest it affect morale. These days it’s different (and better). Because of technological, not moral, advance. Instant electronic recording and communication of events makes it difficult for secretive governments. World War veterans would be amazed to see that the death of named individual British soldiers in Afghanistan is national news.

St Augustine notably held that all lying was wrong (sinful).

Kant argued for the same position without invoking religion. It is worth detailing his view because it is influential and perceptive, and because of how he dealt with a delicate issue in his own life.

Kant thought that his Categorical Imperative (treat humanity in yourself and in others always as an end, never as a means) entailed duties to oneself and to others. The duty not to lie is a duty to myself. Lying is wrong, not because it harms others (though it often does) but because it uses my rational nature as a means to deceive, it violates a rational being’s self-respect, it harms me. Worst of all is an ‘internal lie’ where I comes to believe my own lies.

Kant goes so far as saying that I musnt lie to an axe murderer at my door, as to the whereabouts of my friend, his intended victim, who is hiding in my back room. This seems extreme, and many argue (indeed Kant says as much in earlier writings) that sometimes a questioner has forfeited the right to the truth eg the axe murderer, or a torturer bent on getting me to disclose where my comrades are hiding. But Kant’s duties are unconditional (categorical) so there is a tension here in Kant’s views.

Kant’s own action is instructive as to how he deals with this tension. His antireligious writings annoyed the King and his censors who asked Kant to stop it. Kant appeased them with the statement ‘As your Majesty’s faithful subject, I shall… desist from all public lectures or papers on the subject’. He knew the old King would soon die, Kant would then no longer be his subject, and would be free to say what he liked. Kant later said his words were chosen ‘most carefully, so that I should not be deprived of my freedom… forever, but only so long as His Majesty was alive’. In short, he was guilty not of a lie, rather of a misleading truth, thereby preserving the letter of the moral law.

Others do the same. President Clinton’s approach to TV questioning about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky was Kantian. He declared ‘I did not have sexual relations with that woman’. Later, admitting oral sex had occurred, he said this did not amount to ‘sexual relations’ understood as a procreative or potentially procreative act, so that he had not lied. Not an edifying example of a misleading truth though.

But consider this example:

My friend, very poor, has gone without to buy me a birthday gift. I open it, he smiles, anticipating my delight. A hideously patterned shirt that I will never wear is revealed. My options are:

1. Truth — ‘It’s hideous. I’ll never wear it.’

2. Lie (‘white lie’) — ‘It’s beautiful. Thank you.’

3. Misleading truth — ‘Wow! That’s really striking. Thanks very much.’

Surely the white lie is better than the hurtful truth, and maybe the misleading truth is best. Obviously the latter is generally applicable — I can tell the axe murderer (truthfully) ‘I saw my friend down the supermarket half an hour ago’.

So, I think white lies to avoid unnecessary hurt or offence, and lies to those bent on serious harm who arguably have no right to truth, are justifiable, and maybe a misleading truth is even better. Maybe government lying to the people can sometimes be seen as being in one of these two justifiable categories.

Ambi asked:

Hi, I hope you can help me with this please. It is a riddle that has
been given to me, that I am finding impossible to answer:Who is the most intelligent person, the one who cheats and passes the exam or the one who cannot cheat and fails?

I see what this question is getting at but the riddle is, like most riddles, a consequence of it being a rather confused one. Cheating and not-cheating at exams is not a dependable measure of intelligence. Professor Moriarty seems to have been just as intelligent as Sherlock Holmes. Everything would depend on the circumstances. The person who did not cheat may have had less to lose by failing, and may have cheated if put in the other person’s place.

We cannot assume that the circumstances were the same for both exam-takers, as we would for a physics experiment, for these circumstances would have to include their personal history, their state of mind, their motivation and so forth, and we would end up having to define them as being in effect the same person, and then they would not make two different decisions.