Christopher asked:

Nietzsche is famous for stating that ‘God is dead.’ After reading Zarathustra I felt that what he meant by this statement is that because of the progress of science and the fact that more and more church ‘dogma’ was being disproved he felt that belief in god was no longer needed and that Zarathustra’s primary purpose was to give a basis for morality in a godless world. However, he talks about god dying because of his pity for humans. What does he mean by that? Also, does he consider pity a ‘sin’ because in expresses a level of stature in that the person pitying is perceived as being ‘better than’ the person being pitied, or because pity only makes the person being pitied become more ‘pitiful?’

Answer by Martin Jenkins

Nietzsche evaluates Christian and ‘Modern Ideas’ as symptomatic of physiological decline of the peoples of Europe. Their drives – which are instantiations of will to power – are in chaos. Each drive wants to rule. This inner physiological storm makes people weary, exhausted-literally world weary. According to Nietzsche, priestly theology blames this sickness on sin. It is punishment for not following the strictures of the priests. Nietzsche obviously does not believe in sin but he understands it as a Priestly device that attempts to account for the suffering of the slave masses. The natural drives are to be condemned, as is this worldly life in preference of another super sensible world – the afterlife.

Part of the theological world outlook is pity. As this life is so unfair, so hard, so terrible, we should pity ourselves. Nietzsche opposes pity on the grounds that it is a depressive, it makes people worse. Instead of trying to combat their sickness with affirmative, earthly values, people accept it by applying pity. Pity augments their unfortunate situation. ‘Never mind, this world is awful, let’s gnash our teeth and wail but the next will be better’. It reinforces a negative, world negating view. Pessimistic fatalism is hegemonic over life-affirmation. Nietzsche would prefer a world affirming ethos that follows from his ‘revaluation of all values.’

A further aspect of pity according to Nietzsche, is that it actually conserves the sick contrary to the laws of evolution and natural selection [Anti-Christian #7] The sick ought to perish but, Pity keeps them alive. So according to Nietzsche, Pity is anti-life.

‘Let me repeat, this depressing and contagious instinct stands against all those instincts which work for the preservation and enhancement of life. In the role of the protector of the miserable, it is a prime agent in the promotion of decadence-pity persuades to extinction… Of course, one doesn’t say ‘extinction’, one says ‘the other world’, or ‘God’ or ‘Nirvana’ salvation, blessedness.’ [Anti-Christian ibid]

Transference Theory of God

Also in The Anti-Christian, Nietzsche analyses the different conceptions of God, gods, a people has at different times in its history. For example, an earlier conception of God was that of power, joy, hopes, of victory. This corresponded to the success the Jewish people were enjoying at the time. Hence a naturalistic conception of God existed expressing the affirmativity of the will to power of the people: expressive of national egoism as Nietzsche terms it.

When society started to experience setbacks this was interpreted by the Priests, as punishment by God for the failure of the people to obey His will. He becomes the judgemental, wrathful and vengeful God.

With the triumph of the slave revolt in morality, God becomes the god of the world weary slaves and Priests. The physiological decline of a people which is also a decline in their will to power is transferred and represented in their conception of God. He becomes the God of the physiologically degraded, the sick or as they term themselves – the ‘good’.

‘How can we be so tolerant of the naivete of Christian Theologians as to join in their doctrine that the evolution of the concept God from ‘the god of Israel’, the god of a people, to the Christian god, the essence of all goodness, is to be described as ‘progress’?… When everything necessary to an ascending life, when all that is strong, courageous, masterful and proud has been eliminated from the concept ‘God’: when he sunk step by step to a staff for the weary, a sheet anchor for the drowning: when he becomes the poor man’s god, the sinner’s god, the invalid god par excellence and the attribute of ‘saviour’ or ‘redeemer’ remains as one of the essential attributes of Divinity-just what is the significance of such a metamorphosis? What does the reduction of the god-head imply?’

This is a ‘transference theory’ conception of God as espoused famously by Ludwig Feuerbach. Here, ‘God’ is the representation of transferred human desires, fears, characteristics. Hence, following the successful revaluation of values by the Priest led slave masses, their conception of God expresses their values. And if their God practices their pity, he would be persuaded that life is not worth living; that his creations-human beings-are such an unpleasant spectacle. He shares their pity, pities them and the logic of this contagion kills him.

Martin Jenkins received the ISFP Fellowship for his dissertation ‘Aristocratic Radicalism or Anarchy? An Examination of Nietzsche’s Doctrine of Will to Power’. He is a Pathways Mentor.

 

Marissa asked:

What does each figure in the Allegory of the Cave represent?

Answer by Helier Robinson

If Plato were writing today the prisoners in the cave would be couch potatoes watching television. The television pictures are images of daily life. If the prisoners in the cave are released they perceive the origin of their images, the slaves carrying objects that throw the shadows on the wall; the couch potatoes, released from their lifelong-to-date television watching, would discover that the television pictures were images of daily life.

The point, for Plato, is that daily life is itself a series of images: images of the forms, which can be known by those who achieve wisdom. Plato claimed that there are two worlds: the sensible world of daily life, and the ideal world of the forms. The sensible world represents the world of the forms by means of images, and is largely illusory.

You get a better idea what all this is about from the metaphor of the divided line. The bottom half of the line consists of daily life, and below that, images of daily life such as soap operas. And this bottom half is itself an image of the top half. The top half consists of the world of the forms, and below it an image of it in the form of mathematics and logical thought.

The more we know this image of the world of forms the more we discover the forms themselves, and so gain wisdom. The word wisdom (sophia) has been so debased over time (think of wise-crack and wise-guy) that a better way of thinking of all this is to treat the bottom half of the line as irrational, the lower part of the top half as rational, and the top portion as supra-rational. Wisdom is supra-rational.

Helier Robinson is Emeritus Professor in Philosophy, University of Guelph. His books are available from http://SharebooksPublishing.com.

 

Answer by Geoffrey Klempner

I would like to know a bit more about the couch potatoes, the people who pander to them and also the ‘slaves’ who work in the couch-potato-pandering industry, otherwise known as television.

The couch potatoes know that the images are taken from daily life: the question is what the images tell them about that life. The TV image is a fantasy re-creation of the actual world, epitomized in soap operas no doubt, but also and more subversivly in things we take to be factual like the TV news.

This isn’t about alleged bias of news programs. The BBC or CBS do a good job. The problem is in the process of consuming – being invited to consume – information from a passive perspective, when one is disconnected from any sense of relationship to the events in the world outside, or indeed any sense of responsibility for those events.

Plato wouldn’t refuse to watch television. He would say that it’s fine to get our entertainment or information this way. But we need a corrective. The panderers cannot supply the necessary corrective. For that, you need philosophers.

http://www.philosophypathways.com/vita.html

 

Bill asked:

How do you put this argument in standard form:

One thing we can all agree on is that a statement like 17 is prime is true, and that we know it to be true. But this simple fact gives rise to an irresolvable puzzle. If its a normal subject/ predicate sentence, we can’t explain how we know it to be true. For if its that sort of sentence, then there must be some object, the one we call ’17’, and it has to have the property of primeness. But if there is such an object, it is outside space and time, and so a mystery how we come to know anything about it. Could it be some other sort of claim, then, besides a normal subject/predicate sentence? I suppose, but then we have a different mystery. It’s utterly mysterious what other sorts of sentences there are.

Answer by Craig Skinner

Your analysis is pretty sound. We just need to take it a bit further.

’17 is prime’ is indeed a subject/predicate sentence. There are other sorts of sentences, such as commands, questions, expressions of attitudes, but we needn’t pursue this.

Standard semantics requires that for ’17 is prime’ to be true, 17 must exist. We want it to be true because we feel that 17 just IS prime (it’s a necessary, apriori truth) whatever the metaphysicians and language philosophers say.

But if we hold that 17 is an abstract object (Platonism), outside space and time as you put it, we have the ‘access’ problem, as you say – how can we know about it, how can it influence us? Some talk of knowing numbers by ‘mathematical intuition’ (Godel was big on this), but it remains mysterious. Note, though, that if you say abstract objects dont exist, you have to find some other mode of existence for other alleged abstract objects, such as propositions. But let’s go with no abstract objects for now.

To make the sentence true, we must either give up or get round standard semantics, or find some other plausible mode of existence for numbers.

Let us deal with each.

1. Give up standard semantics.

This was Meinong’s approach. In his ‘Theory of Objects’, he complained that our metaphysics was sadly deficient because we only considered existing entities, leaving out the vast realm of nonexistent entities. A key feature of his theory was that even though an object is nonexistent, it can still have properties. So, no problem with 17 being prime even though 17 doesn’t exist, or with Santa having a red suit. This whole idea was dismissed as nonsensical by Russell and Quine, but I dont think it is. However, I do think that we can get the advantages of nonexistent objects, and none of the problems, if we regard numbers (and Santa, and Sherlock Holmes) as fictional entities rather than nonexistent ones (see below).

2. Get round standard semantics.

I think this is weaselly. It’s called Paraphrase Nominalism. It holds that when people say ’17 is prime’ they really mean ‘If numbers existed then 17 would be prime’. I dont think they do mean that. I dont. I mean 17 IS prime.

3. Modes of existence.

(a) physical. John Stuart Mill thought numbers were physical, existing only as 3 trees, 19 eggs etc, and that 2+3 =5 was an empirical discovery, revealed to us when we put, say, two twigs alongside three twigs and find five. Everybody else thinks that three twigs is just an instance of the number ‘3’ just as the ’17’s in the present text are instances (numerals), not 17 itself.

(b) mental. Very implausible. Unless right now somebody is thinking of that very number, the third prime number after 27 quadrillion doesn’t exist. Or is anybody thinking of the quintillionth digit of Pi right now?

(c) abstract. We’ve said we’re unhappy with this.

(d) fictional. Here the sentence ’17 is prime’ is prefixed by the Fictional Operator ie ‘ F [’17 is prime’]’. Or, ‘In the story of mathematics, 17 is prime’. Just as ‘In the stories of Conan Doyle, Holmes plays the violin’

I favour fictionalism as an account of mathematical truth. Mathematics is a human construction, comprising axioms; and entities such as numbers, reducible to sets, in turn all derivable from the empty set; and proceeding by logical deduction to yield a vast number of theorems, many surprising, and often found indispensable to physics.

So, in summary, let us keep standard semantics, and say that ’17 is prime’ is true in the story of mathematics because that is where 17 exists as a fictional object.

Craig Skinner at PhiloSophos.com

 

Marisol asked:

How is Mill’s understanding of higher pleasures related to questions of beneficence, self-sacrifice and social reform?

Answer by Geoffrey Klempner

This is a continuation of a question which I answered last week, from Jessica who asked Why dissatisfied Socrates is better than a satisfied pig.

Let’s assume that Mill is right in drawing a distinction between higher and lower pleasures within a utilitarian theory that seeks to maximise happiness. Last time, I considered the problem of quantifying the difference in value between different pleasures. But let’s assume that isn’t a problem. We are not looking for a quantifiable decision theory but just a guide to making the right moral choices in a particular situation.

In utilitarianism, of whatever flavour, every moral act is an act of self-sacrifice, insofar as I, the agent, consider my needs, interests and desires as counting for one and no more than one in the overall calculation. Very few people would think like this, but that is what utilitarianism requires when strictly followed through. Given the millions and millions of potential recipients of my beneficence, my needs and interests don’t get much attention.

On the other hand, a utilitarian could make the case that if I don’t look after myself, and see that I need the basic things to keep me happy, then I am not going to be very good at promoting the happiness of others. So let’s waive this point.

What is beneficence? I love philosophy. I think it’s a wonderful thing. So, naturally, I would like others to like it too. But let’s say you prefer getting drunk and partying all night. All you ask from me is money for beer. You are most upset that I will only give money to pay for your self-improvement by taking a course in philosophy. This is one of the fracture points of consequentialist ethics. R.M. Hare takes the view, for example, that it is ‘fanatical’ to impose one’s likes and dislikes on others, and that includes beliefs about which pleasures are ‘higher’ or ‘lower’. If money for beer is what you desire, then I should give you money for beer.

(Just as an aside, in terms of beer money, it occurs to me that the cost of a Pathways Program taken over 30 weeks, is equivalent to one bottle of beer a day. Not such a good example, then!)

So the thing with beneficence in relation to the higher and lower pleasures is that one is faced with the old problem, do you give people what they want, or what you think would make them better, lead them to experience the higher pleasures?

With the distinction between higher and lower pleasures there arise new opportunities for self-sacrifice. If you lack the intelligence to take a course in philosophy, then it seems that according to Mill you are morally bound to support those who can, even at the cost of denying yourself the lower pleasures.

I’m not going to discuss social reform, because I think you can probably work this out for yourself, from what I’ve said.

Good luck with your essay.

http://www.philosophypathways.com/vita.html

 

Robert asked:

Regarding the term ‘Concrete’ as opposed to ‘Abstract’. Does ‘concrete’ mean a sensible (detectable by the senses) thing, ie a corporeal sensible thing, or only a ‘particular’ thing. I can think of a nonmaterial particular thing such as the Angel Gabriel. Would this be an instance of a ‘Concrete’ thing.

Answer by Craig Skinner

One standard classification of what exists is as follows:

Entities (Existents) comprise Universals and Particulars.

Universals comprise:

* properties (e.g. redness)

* relations ( e.g. bigger than)

Particulars comprise:

* concrete particulars, in turn divided into Things (objects, physical items) and Events (e.g collisions, or my feeling bored, which we can regard as a mental Event or as a mental Thing if you wish).

* abstract particulars (eg numbers, propositions).

Universals have instances in Particulars. So, for example, the Universal property ‘redness’ has an instance in a particular post box.

Equivalently, Particulars are instances of Universals. For example, Birmingham’s relation to Gretna Green is as an instance of the Universal relation ‘bigger than’. 17 is an instance of the Universal property ‘primeness’.

So, some concrete particulars are indeed, as you say, ‘corporeal sensible things’ (Things), chairs for instance, others are not, being particular events (Andy Murray winning Olympic gold, say).

The Angel Gabriel, if he (it?) existed, would be a particular, not abstract, therefore concrete. Presumably not physical. Hence a series of concrete Mental Particulars, or if you think mental activity has to inhere in some immaterial substance, a concrete immaterial Thing. Not detectable by the senses, unless miraculously able to assume sensible form and appear to you. Gods, demons and devils would all be in this category. I must say I think it is an empty category (other than in imagination and fiction).

Not everybody agrees with the above classification.

Some deny Universals, holding that the redness of a particular post box is not an instance of anything, rather just a particular redness (a ‘trope’ or ‘mode’ of that box, not transferable without the box).

Others augment the Universals category to include Kinds (Substantial Universals, as opposed to Properties and Relations which are Non-substantial Universals). Thus ‘human being’ would be a Substantial Kind and you and I, being instances, are Substantial Particulars. A Substance, roughly, is something that can bear properties or relational instances eg a post box, me, an electron, Gabriel (he would be an immaterial substance of course).

Yet others deny Abstract Particulars, holding that numbers, say, are fictional entities (existing only in the story of mathematics, as Sherlock Holmes exists only in the stories of Conan Doyle), or even nonexistent entities that nevertheless have properties (like being prime).

I hope this has clarified rather than confused. I must admit that Ontological Categories is not the best choice of topic when you try to explain why philosophy matters to somebody who thinks it’s all probably a waste of time. This kind of metaphysics was big in Aristotle’s and in mediaeval philosophy, lost ground in modern times, but is looking up again in the 21st Century (E J Lowe’s ‘The Four Category Ontology’ is a good example).

Craig Skinner at PhiloSophos.com

 

Answer by Helier Robinson

Your question involves two classifications: concrete and abstract, and particular and universal. The concrete is often defined as ‘known through the senses’ but a better definition is simply ‘any sensation’, such as a colour, sound, taste, smell, or a tactile sensation such as hot or cold, hard or soft, heavy or light, rough or smooth, or penetrable or impenetrable. This is a better definition because we also know relations through the senses (for example: ‘This tree is taller than that one’) and relations are abstract: that is, they have no concrete qualities. Particulars are names or descriptions that apply to individuals; thus Socrates and Plato’s philosophy teacher are respectively a name and a description of one person.

Universals are names or descriptions that apply plurally; that is, to more than one individual. The problem of universals is the problem of what their meaning is. Traditionally there are three answers: nominalism, conceptualism, and realism (or Platonism).

Nominalism is the view that words for universals are their own meanings; this is best illustrated by the phrase that all thought is silent speech. We cannot think without language. This view is advocated by those, like Bishop Berkeley, who cannot discover abstract ideas in their own minds. It has several defects: it cannot explain synonyms, and it cannot explain how one abstract proposition can be stated in two different languages.

For those who can discover abstract ideas introspectively, these difficulties vanish. A concept is a combination of a word and an abstract idea and a proposition is a series of concepts that convey a structure of abstract ideas in language. Any language can convey any one proposition. This is conceptualism.

Platonism is the more elaborate view that all abstract ideas have a reference, so that, for example, the abstract idea conveyed by the word ‘two’ and the numeral 2, is the number two. This has difficulties also, because how can you distinguish the number two and instances of it? In the expression 2+2=2×2=2*2 there are six instances of two, but which is the number two itself?

One further distinction is between thought and imagination: thought deals with abstract ideas and imagination deals with concrete images of sensations: usually pictures, but also sounds for some people such as composers or tastes for chefs. So, to answer your question, the concrete is sensational and may be either particular or universal, and is perceived or imagined; and the abstract is non-concrete and is discovered introspectively by some people or is thought. And the Angel Gabriel is concrete and imagined, or possibly perceived.

Helier Robinson is Emeritus Professor in Philosophy, University of Guelph. His books are available from http://SharebooksPublishing.com.

 

Bryan asked:

Hey, I’ve been reading and researching a lot on Descartes and his views on the mind and the body. I’m have a bit of trouble differentiating how he feels about the mind and the body though. My questions are ‘Why does Descartes think you can never divide the mind? and ‘Why does he think you can ALWAYS divide the body?’ I would really appreciate if someone can clear those 2 things up regarding Descartes. Thanks!

Answer by Martin Jenkins

The work, Meditations On the First Philosophy is an attempt to find a secure basis for human knowledge. Once this is established then the world of material objects can be explained and accounted for by natural Science, particularly physics. Descartes was involved in this project of Natural Sciences, Natural Philosophy.

As part of his endeavour to discover such a secure basis, Descartes, as I’m sure you know Bryan, asked where it could come from. The senses? Well they can be misleading as perceived images are different from the objects themselves; self-evident images that declare he is sitting by the fire are also experienced in dreams yet dreaming is considered not to be ‘reality’. So the self-evidence of images, representations are far from conclusive.

Admitting that representations are dubious, the certainties afforded by mathematics and geometry cannot be doubted. Who can seriously doubt that 2+2=4?!! Even this is not immune from sceptical doubt. For the good God whom Descartes has believed in could, it is proposed, be a deceiver. So when Descartes concludes that 2+2=4, he could very well be deceived. If the good God is removed from creating and sustaining the creation, then the deceiving deity can commit unlimited deception with it. In sum, the truth of everything can be doubted-nothing can be known with certainty.

In the second Meditation, Descartes concludes that even if he is the subject of deception, this apparently hopeless situation yields one truth – that something must exist to be subject to deception. That something is himself, of the ‘I’. This possesses apodictic, a-priori certainty. For whilst everything can be doubted, it cannot be doubted that something is doing the doubting or being subject to doubt. This something is an I, and when it doubts, it is thinking. The existence and nature of the self-evident foundation for human knowledge has been secured by Descartes: Cogito ergo sum, I think, therefore I am. I am a thinking thing, thinking occurs in a Mind. So the existence of a Mind is also established by his meditation. The tides of doubt were halted.

Surely then, Descartes reasons, that the nature of an I as a thinking thing is established, then so too, objects before him in the world such as tables, chairs, mountains, the wax immediately before him and his body with which he is intimately involved must also exist? The wax is examined and although information conveyed by his senses tell him it changes shape, texture, smell, the judgement of his mind convinces him that objectively, something continues to exist beneath such superficial changes [I.e. substance]. Judgements of the Mind and not images from the body allow Objective Ideas to be formed. Yet the deceiver could still be deceiving him. So, he cannot conclude with equal certainty that along with mind, bodies – including his own, actually do exist. The existence of a thinking thing alone remains certain.

Mind and Body

This conclusion heralds not only an epistemological distinction – that existence of Mind is known more easily than the existence of the body, bodies in general; it also heralds an ontological distinction. Namely, that the existence and nature of Mind is separate, distinct from that of Body. The mind might not depend on Body for its existence – it may very well be able to exist without it. Mind does not possess physical, material extension – it cannot be observed out there in the world in the same way as a chair or any other body [still subject to doubt at this stage] can, it cannot be measured, weighed, dissected and divided as bodies can. Hence the nature of Mind is very distinct from that of Body. ‘I am not that assemblage of limbs we call the human body’ Descartes concludes. Whilst a Body is understood by Descartes as:

‘…whatever can be determined by a certain shape, comprised in a certain location, whatever so fills a certain space as to exclude it from any other body, whatever can be apprehended by touch, sight, hearing, taste or smell and whatever can be moved in various ways…’ [Meditation II]

None of these characteristics apply to the Mind as established by Descartes. Hence the distinction Bryan, between Mind and Body. If the Mind is not a body, then it cannot be dissected, divided-because it does not occupy space. It is immaterial and indivisible. What is immaterial cannot be treated as that which is material. A body, such as a plank of wood, occupies space and is physical, so it can be divided by the saw.

On one side, this established other problems for Descartes’ view-for how can immaterial mind interact with material body and vice versa – the celebrated Mind-Body problem in Philosophy. On the other side, clear and distinct ideas which are logically irrefutable [a-priori] can be found and judged by the Mind. Such an Objective Idea, is that of a most perfect, powerful and good being-God. The existence of God is examined and in the Third and Fifth Meditations. In the Fifth, the nature of God necessitates his existence further concluding that God cannot not exist. The Ontological argument applied here entails that God’s most perfect nature entails his necessary existence. His perfection cannot countenance imperfection – such as deceit or deception. So, a world of bodies, objects exists because God creates it and would not deceive otherwise. Hence the sceptical doubts of Descartes are answered. Further, because the faculty of reason found in the Mind, can, if applied clearly and distinctly, conclude not only that it has been placed there by Him but that a-priori Reason can so understand this world by means of mathematics, geometry: natural physics. Theology is the handmaiden of natural science. Yet the distinction between Mind and Body remained, especially how they were to interact. Descartes proffered the solution that interaction occurred in the pineal gland although this failed to convince other, thinking minds.

I hope that answers your questions Bryan.

Martin Jenkins received the ISFP Fellowship for his dissertation ‘Aristocratic Radicalism or Anarchy? An Examination of Nietzsche’s Doctrine of Will to Power’. He is a Pathways Mentor.