Adrian asked:

What is the difference between acting in accordance with duty, and acting from duty, and what is the relevance of the distinction for Immanuel Kant’s argument in book 1 of the Groundwork?

Answer by Craig Skinner

Good question.

I’ll deal with the difference, its relevance, and a common misunderstanding.

The difference:

In acting from duty, and in acting in accordance with duty, the action is the same. The difference relates to the motivation of the act (my will).

Thus, in acting from duty, I perform the action because it is my duty, irrespective of whether or not I am inclined to do it, or of whether or not it is in my interests.

Contrariwise, in acting in accordance with duty, whilst I do perform the action that duty commands, I don’t do it for that reason. Rather I do it because I am inclined to – it pleases me or is in my interests.

Kant’s examples illustrate.

(1) A shopkeeper is honest with a naive, easily duped customer, not because it is his duty to be honest, but because it will help build his good reputation, and his business. He acts in accordance with duty (he is honest) but not from duty (ie not because honesty is right whether or not it helps his reputation and business).

(2) A philanthropist helps the needy, not because this is his duty, but because it pleases him – he finds ‘inner satisfaction in spreading joy’. Again, he acts in accordance with, not from, duty.

(3) The philanthropist is going through a really bad time in his life. He no longer has any inclination to help the needy, and it gives him no pleasure. Nevertheless he does it because it is the right thing to do. Now he acts from duty.

Relevance of the distinction:

Only acting from duty has genuine moral worth. Recall that for Kant, morality is something that all rational beings can self-prescribe simply because they are rational. No desire or inclination can underpin morality because not all rational beings will, necessarily and universally, have these desires (the unhappy philanthropist, for example, has no desire to help the needy). Furthermore a desire can conflict with duty eg a desire to help a man at dead of night struggling to lift a statue into his car boot outside the back door of the museum.

In disconnecting morality from desire, Kant is opposing Hume’s passion-based (rather than reason-based) account of moral motivation.

Common misunderstanding:

That we act morally only if our inclinations are opposed to the action ie only if we do it with a long face rather than with pleasure.

This view is captured in the words of Kant’s contemporary, Schiller:

‘Gladly I serve my friends, but regrettably I do it with pleasure. Thus I am often troubled by the fact that I am not virtuous,’

with the riposte,

‘The only advice for you is to try to despise them. And thus to do with repugnance what duty commands.’

This misrepresents Kant. His message is that action has moral worth when motivated by duty, not by inclination. There is no need for any opposition. Indeed he says that inclination can aid the good will. He is saying that acting from duty is more readily evident (‘more manifest’) when it clearly goes against inclination.

He is sometimes accused of holding a contrary view to Aristotle who says that the fully virtuous man acts rightly desiring to do it, and is morally superior to the less virtuous person who is merely self-controlled (‘continent’) and acts contrary to inclination. But Kant’s target is Humean benevolence, not Aristotle.

We might think that the judgment on the happy philanthropist is a bit harsh: surely he is at least as appealing a figure as the unhappy philanthropist. He is. But this only shows, on a Kantian view, that moral actions are not the only good ones. Indeed, most of us would prefer a friend to visit us in hospital because she wants to, because she is a friend, because she cares about us, rather than because it is an unpleasant duty ie we prefer actions (in accordance with duty) from love rather than from duty.

As to whether it is more admirable to act well when it is hard to do so, the late Philippa Foot clarified this nicely by pointing out that it depends on what makes it hard, circumstances or character.

If circumstances, then more admirable. Example: a very poor person sees wallet dropped by rich man and returns it unhesitatingly. She acts more admirably than a comfortably-off finder would – she is tested (she could really do with the cash) but comes through.

If character, then less admirable. Example: finder sorely tempted to keep wallet, dithers about it but eventually returns it.

Duane asked:

What is induction and why can it be said that this form of reasoning is ultimately circular?

Answer by Helier Robinson

Induction is a fancy name for generalisation. Generalisation might be called animal learning. If your cat is fed cat food out of cans (tins, in Britain) and you do not eat canned food, then the cat will quickly learn that the sound of a can-opener means food, and will come running. The unreliability of this kind of learning would be shown if one day you decide to eat some canned peaches, and so disappoint the cat. Humans generalise in this way, and often very badly, as shown by stereotyping (‘All Canadian men are either lumberjacks or Mounties’) and by superstitions (touching wood or crossing the fingers to avert bad luck).

The word induction is meant to refer to generalisation that is well done, as in formulating scientific laws, but a major problem in philosophy of science is the problem of induction: how to justify induction while condemning superstition and stereotyping. One attempted solution to this problem is to postulate the principle of uniformity of nature: if nature has uniformities then descriptions of those uniformities can safely by generalised; another attempted solution is to say that scientific induction clearly works well and so is justified. Both of these fail because the only knowledge we can have of the principle of uniformity of nature and of the success of scientific induction is inductive, thereby seemingly making induction ultimately circular. However it is not in principle ultimately circular. If, for example, you could prove that Leibniz’ claim that this is the best of all possible worlds (that is, the world of all the underlying causes of phenomena is the best of all possibles) then scientific induction would have to work, since if it did not then the world would be inferior to the best.

Gigi asked:

I have a writing assignment in my philosophy class and one of the sections is to:

Explain how Plato’s epistemological assumptions shape his metaphysics.

I have read the material on the allegory of the cave and the Republic and I’m still struggling with how to write this part.

The professor gave us a hint which is: Why does he think that there must be Forms? Plato says (in effect),

‘Since knowledge is ____

therefore the objects of knowledge must be _____.’

Any advice would be greatly appreciated.

Answer by Jürgen Lawrenz

I’m not going to write your assignment for you, but really, the issue is very simple.

Everything in the world is imperfect. Water drops might form neat little spheres, but every water drop is different from every other.

In a field of clover, they all look the same; but when you inspect them from close up, there is minute variation everywhere.

However, you could say: we KNOW what a sphere, a clover, or a tiger or herring looks like, because they are individual specimens of a TYPE.

This is where we form a judgement that all individuals must belong to some pattern of FORM. Accordingly when we see such a pattern or form in nature, we recognise it, even though in many detail it differs from the last specimen we saw. We then go ahead and establish, say, a taxonomy: certain kinds of animals are cats because they share cat-like features. And so on. In other words: We create an IDEA in our minds about a species of some animal or thing.

Plato believed that such IDEAS are eternal. In our language, he might have said: they are the thoughts in a creator’s mind. The creator might say to himself: I have an idea for a tiger and now I will create living examples of the idea. The idea in God’s mind would be of one perfect specimen, which in the real world of sexual reproduction is not, of course, going to be reproduced identically in every detail.

So our KNOWLEDGE of things depends on having a true IDEA in our mind.

The parable of the cave is an exaggerated way of saying: in this world, the world we live in, we are trapped by our senses, which cannot capture the essence of the form in any actual thing. Our sense must make judgements about the imperfect specimen before our eyes. If not, they might bite!

But if you ponder the form you see philosophically, then you will understand the essence of that form.

Is that clear now?

Marie asked:

My question is about Descartes’ dualism, MindBody Problem, I don’t quite understand it; I don’t get how he came to the conclusion that mind and body are two different substance. I’m hoping that you would be able to explain it to me please. Thank you!

Answer by Jürgen Lawrenz

it is very simple. Just look at the world and ask yourself: Is everything material? Or are there things in the world that are not material, but I still know they exist?

Then, ask yourself a second question: how can I arrive at a definition so that the two cannot be confused?

So now: Descartes said that every material thing is defined by having extension. Which is another way of saying: it occupies space. Moreover it cannot share that space with another things. Even water or gas can be reduced to particles, and then you find they are extended things. So each occupies a unique portion of space.

So the first substance, which he called ‘res extensa’, is clearly matter. What about my mind, my emotions and beliefs? Well, they are not things in that sense. They are not extended, so do they do not occupy space. So they must be a non-material substance. These he called ‘res cogitans’, or thought-like things.

And now the confusion between them stops. If you can measure something in space, as having a length, breadth, width etc., then it must be a material substance. If you can’t measure it, then it must be a thought-like substance.

This is the origin of his dual-substance doctrine. A human being is both matter (flesh and bones) and thought-things (mind, emotions etc.).

One little addition: In Descartes’ time people believed in ghosts. But after Descartes it was impossible to believe in them any more. Since you can’t see thought-like things, not even under a microscope, how come we can see ghosts? So there is something fishy! If you can see them, they must be material things! But now you can’t catch a ghost, and immediately you have a self-contradiction on your hand. Conclusion: There are no ghosts, only people believing they saw them, in other words, hallucinating.

Hope this helps!

Answer by Oliver Leech

Below are the arguments presented by Descartes himself to justify his substance dualism.

(There are many other arguments that could be used in support of his position and many objections to substance dualism. )

MIND/ BODY DISTINCTION

Descartes proves his own existence as a mind or thinking thing (res cogitans) in Meditation II. He proves the existence of his body in his wider proof of material things by the end of Meditation VI. The essential principle of Cartesian dualism is that mind and body are not identical but quite distinct, separate substances.

He gives three proofs that the mind and the body are distinct. An important implication of this argument is that the mind, as a separate substance, might exist without the body.

Leibniz’s Law: for two objects to be one and the same thing, whatever is true of the one must be also true of the other. If Descartes can show that the mind has different properties from the body, then, by Leibniz’s Law, he has shown that the mind and the brain are not identical:

THE ARGUMENT FROM DOUBT

a. Reference: Discourse Part 4 and Meditation II.

b. BASIC ARGUMENT:

i. I can doubt that I have a body.

ii. I cannot doubt that I am.

iii. Therefore, I who am doubting and thinking am not a body.

c. In short, I cannot doubt that I exist (as a mind, a thinking thing, res cogitans) but I can doubt that I have a body (a physical object). Therefore, I (the mind, the thinking thing) am not the same substance as my body.

d. Present the argument as a formula:

i. I cannot doubt the existence of M.

ii. I can doubt the existence of B.

iii. Therefore, M is not the same as B.

e. Present analogous arguments, using the same formula.

i. Represent mashed potato as M and carbohydrate as B.

ii. I cannot doubt the existence of M.

iii. I can doubt the existence of B.

iv. Therefore, mashed potato is not the same as carbohydrate (and, by implication, mashed potato could exist without carbohydrate).

v. Clearly there is something wrong with this argument.

f. Another analogy: Lois Lane thinks:

i. I do not doubt that Clark Kent is a journalist.

ii. I doubt that Superman is a journalist.

iii. Therefore, Clark Kent is not Superman.

iv. (But Clark Kent is Superman. There must be something wrong with the argument. )

g. Try Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde or devise your own example to make the point.

h. Perhaps the fallacy in the argument is that when Descartes introduces the ideas of doubting and of not doubting, he is referring to two different ways of thinking that he finds in himself. Doubting and not doubting are not attributes of the mind and of the body but of his response to the mind and the body. Consequentially, the fact that they are different tells us nothing about the mind and the body, whether they are or they are not different. If Descartes had argued that the mind was indubitable (incapable of being doubted) and that the body was dubitable (capable of being doubted), then the mind and the body would have different properties and, therefore, by Leibniz’s law be different things. But Descartes has not shown that this is the case, only that he can doubt one and not doubt the other.

THE DIVISIBILITY/ INDIVISIBILITY ARGUMENT

a. Reference: Meditation VI: ‘there is a great difference between mind and body, in that body, by its nature, is always divisible and that mind is entirely indivisible… my mind… a thinking thing [has] no parts… but [is] one single and complete thing.’

Read through the argument.

b. DIVISIBILITY: the body, a physical thing, can be described in terms of the quantitative language of physics, that is, it has size, shape, extension, motion; as such it is divisible. For example, it is easy to conceive that anything that has dimensions might be divided into smaller parts. Any number can be divided and so any measurement can be divided.

c. INDIVISIBILITY: the mind, by contrast, is thought of in qualitative terms. Particular states of mind, for example, the sound of a violin, the smell of perfume, seeing the blue of a clear sky seem not capable of being divided. How could you have half a sound or smell? (You might have a quieter sound, i.e. , half the volume or a less intense smell but that is not the same as dividing. )

d. In short, we cannot conceive of half a mind while we can always conceive of half of a body, however small.

e. Descartes argues that if a foot were amputated, i.e. , the body has been shown to be divisible but nothing has been taken away from the mind.

f. Is it the case that the mind is indivisible? It can be argued that in the case of brain damage, there may be a loss of mental faculties; for example, a patient might lose part of memory, or the capacity to smell; think of the effects of dementia on mental capacity. If we consider the mind to be a set of faculties or capacities, then it does seem that we can lose some and that, therefore, the mind is in this sense divisible. Remember that Descartes thought that the mind was a completely separate entity from the brain; modern science has strongly implied that, whether dualism is true or not, what happens in the mind is very closely related to what happens in the brain. If the brain is damaged in certain ways, the mind is diminished in certain ways.

g. We frequently experience inner conflict. For example, we are tempted (by the cream cake, by the wish to drive fast, by the wish to be lazy) and we desire to resist temptation (to become slim, to be safe drivers, to work hard). This conflict implies that there are separate entities within us, that the mind is not one homogeneous whole but a set of different parts.

THE ARGUMENT FROM CLEAR AND DISTINCT PERCEPTION

a. Reference: Meditation VI : SUMMARY: I know that whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive as separate (or as two different things) can be created by God as separate (or as two different things). I know that I exist and I clearly and distinctly see that nothing else belongs to my essential nature except that I am a non-extended thinking thing. On the other hand I have a distinct idea of my body as an extended, non-thinking thing. From this I am certain that I am really distinct from my body and can exist without it.

b. Objections are similar to those to the argument from doubt. Cottingham uses the example of a triangle. I can clearly and distinctly perceive that triangle ABC has the property of being right-angled without clearly and distinctly perceiving that it has the Pythagorean property, namely, that the square on its hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the squares on its other two sides. On Descartes’ reasoning the two properties would be distinct and one could exist without the other. But despite my perception that the one property is quite different from the other, they are in fact essentially linked. Even God could not create a right-angled triangle which lacked the Pythagorean property.

c. Descartes may have successfully shown that he is a thinking thing but this argument does not show what does the thinking might not be corporeal, i.e. , part of his body.

Didi asked:

The question would be how to summarize the argument or arguments and evaluate them?

There is a gaping inconsistency in the logic of our democracy in denying children this fundamental democratic right. Many argue that children haven’t the intelligence and experience to vote in a meaningful way. This argument was used years ago as a reason for denying non-male, non-white people the right to participate in elections. Nobody’s intelligence or experience is of more value than someone else’s. We all bring our own attributes to the ballot box when we select a candidate.

Others may say that children don’t work and thus don’t really contribute to society and therefore shouldn’t vote. Well, School is work. And with a double digit unemployment rate and people on social assistance, this rationale is also absurd. Would we deny the unemployed the right to vote?

Answer by Shaun Williamson

There is no inconsistency here. The usual way of denying the vote to non white people was to say that they were like children and therefore not capable of understanding. The same argument was also used to justify slavery, black people were childlike and needed some big white slave owner to look after them.

Everyone has always agreed that children are not capable of understanding things in the same way that adults do. That is why we do not have the same rules of criminal responsibility for children. That is why we don’t judge them morally in the same way as we do other adults.

Can two year old children understand democracy, can one year old children vote in any meaningful way? At what age do you suggest democratic rights should start?

The idea that no one’s intelligence or experience is of more value than someone else’s is absurd and should certainly not be applied in the design of nuclear power stations. Perhaps we should give children the opportunity to design nuclear power stations.

In our system of democracy we give a vote to all adults (with some exceptions). That is the best system we have been able to devise so far. One of our definition of a child is someone who is too young to understand the responsibilities of being a voting citizen. In some democratic countries not voting is illegal and could result in a jail sentence. Do you want to see children go to jail?

Amit asked:

‘If the things in our world changed their size randomly, we would have no interest in rulers or in measuring things.’

It is the answer given for one of the question.

I got answer that Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental problems, such as those connected with existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind, and language.

These things also changes with time and place so why do we have interest in philosophy?

Answer by Shaun Williamson

You assume that these things change with time and place but you don’t know that, not without investigation. I don’t agree that knowledge, values, reason, mind and language change with time and place in a way that effects philosophical truth.

Philosophy is about truth and truth isn’t relative to time or place. Belief may be relative to time and place but belief isn’t the same as truth.